

Guerrilla Shadows on Gender: The Lingering Effects of the Peruvian Internal Armed Conflict on Women's Political Inclusion

Abstract

How does political violence during armed conflict shape women's access to elected office? I combine victim-level data from Peru's Truth and Reconciliation Commission with municipal electoral records from six elections held during the internal conflict. Using two-way fixed effects models that exploit within-district variation, I separate recent from cumulative violence exposure at local levels. Violence leaves women's candidacies unaffected but shapes their electoral success: recent violence increases the share of women elected, while cumulative violence reduces it. These effects stem primarily from violence perpetrated by insurgent groups, as opposed to state violence. Extending the analysis to post-conflict elections, I find that the positive effect of recent violence disappears while the negative effect of cumulative violence persists, reducing women's electoral success and access to competitive list positions despite the 1997 gender quota. The findings show that the timing and perpetrator of violence, not its mere presence, determine its gendered electoral consequences.

Keywords: internal armed conflict, Peru, guerrilla, electoral behavior, female candidates

1 Introduction

How does political violence during armed conflict shape women's access to elected office? Conflict reorders political life and gender relations at the same time, and in a growing number of countries it does so while elections continue. Most of what scholarship has established about how conflict shapes women's place in politics describes what comes after, from transitional processes and the institutional design of the postwar state (Bouta, Frerks, and Bannon, 2005) to gains in women's representation (Hughes and Tripp, 2015; Bakken and Buhaug, 2021) and their reversal once prewar hierarchies reassert themselves (Aoláin, Haynes, and Cahn, 2011). What happens while the conflict is still underway is a different question, because parties and voters make their choices with the violence around them. It also matters beyond the conflict itself. How violence reshapes the structures that govern access to political power bears on whether the resulting gains or losses for women hold once the conflict ends and democratic institutions resume.

The relationship between conflict and women's access to office may run in two directions. One line of reasoning expects conflict to narrow women's path into politics through both supply and demand: violence raises the cost of standing for office and makes parties more cautious about fielding women (Alizade et al., 2025), while voters may favor leadership coded as masculine during periods of crisis (Damann, Kim, and Tavits, 2024). But there are also cases where the opposite pattern has been observed. Several post-conflict countries, Nicaragua and Rwanda among them, seat more women in their legislatures than the global average (Hughes and Tripp, 2015; Bakken and Buhaug, 2021). Organizational changes during conflict can raise the demand for women candidates (Thomas and Bond, 2015), while women widen their political agency (Yadav, 2021). These gains often prove fragile, as male elites work to restore a prewar order and reassert traditional gender roles once the fighting stops (Aoláin, Haynes, and Cahn, 2011). What this body of work has rarely done is treat the violence behind these effects as something that varies in its timing, its intensity, and who carries it out, instead of as a single condition that is simply present or absent.

The stakes of who reaches office during conflict are high, because women's presence

in politics affects the course of the conflict itself. Women in office after war reduce the risk that it recurs (Shair-Rosenfield and Wood, 2017), and the gender composition of legislatures bears on how conflicts end (Best, Shair-Rosenfield, and Wood, 2019; Hughes, Krook, and Paxton, 2015). The period when violence is still live is the harder one to observe, and it is also the period when parties and voters make the choices that decide whether women reach office. Colombia shows the imbalance in scholarly attention. The gender provisions of its 2015 peace agreement have drawn substantial research (Berry and Lake, 2024), while how decades of active violence shaped women’s electoral outcomes across the conflict has drawn far less, with the recent exception of Rivera, Tappe Ortiz, and Koos (2025). Part of the reason is methodological: active conflict makes data scarce and causal claims hard to sustain.

This paper asks how political violence, understood as the deliberate use of lethal and coercive force by armed actors against civilians and political figures during civil war (Kalyvas, 2006), spanning killings, disappearances, torture, sexual violence, and forced displacement, shapes women’s access to elected office while a conflict is still being fought, using Peru’s Internal Armed Conflict as the setting. As conflict is not one uniform condition, I disaggregate the violence that unfolded along two dimensions: its timing and who carries it out. I separate recent violence (the acts in the two years before an election) from cumulative violence (the total since the conflict began) and test how each bears on both the supply of women candidates and their electoral success. I then ask whether these patterns differ by perpetrator, comparing the violence perpetrated by state forces with that of insurgent groups. Peru suits this analysis because it held municipal elections every three years throughout the conflict, which produced wide variation in violence across districts and over time. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, hereinafter CVR) documented the violence in geographic and temporal detail, which lets me identify its effects through variation within districts over time.

Using municipal fixed effects models that exploit within-district variation across

elections from 1980 to 1995¹, I find that recent and cumulative violence have distinct effects on both candidate supply and electoral outcomes, and that these effects differ by perpetrator. Recent violence increases the share of women among those elected, while cumulative violence lowers it. The pattern is driven by Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL) violence, not state violence: recent SL attacks increase both women’s candidacies and their electoral success, while cumulative SL violence reduces both. Using the ordering of candidates within party lists, I also test where in the electoral process the effect operates, finding that violence moved neither women’s candidacies nor their placement on lists, so the effect ran through which parties voters rewarded, not through parties demoting women. I then explore whether wartime exposure leaves a mark on later elections, examining post-2002 patterns through 2022. The two effects do not carry forward in the same way. The positive wartime association with recent SL violence does not persist, while the negative one does: SL violence continues to reduce women’s electoral success and, unlike during the conflict itself, their access to competitive list positions, even after the 1997 gender quota. State violence leaves no comparable trace, which points to legacies specific to the perpetrator.

I contribute to the literature on conflict and gendered political outcomes on three fronts. First, the timing of violence matters: recent and cumulative exposure bear on women’s access to office in opposite directions, which means a district’s history of violence conditions how a new act of violence is read. This moves past work that treats wartime violence as a single fixed condition. Second, the perpetrator matters, even after the fighting stops. Insurgent violence leaves a lasting mark on women’s electoral prospects while the effects of state violence fade, so a conflict’s legacy depends on who did the harm, not only how much occurred. Third, I bring evidence from the middle of an armed conflict, when parties and voters made their choices while the violence was still unfolding, and not from the postwar transitions that carry most of what we know.

¹ Although the conflict did not officially end until 2000, I use 1995 as the cut-off point as it is the election before the gender quota implementation in 1997.

2 How Wartime Violence Shapes Women’s Political Inclusion

A growing number of countries hold elections in the midst of armed conflict. Most research on violence and elections has concentrated on electoral violence, the coercion used to shape who can run, campaign, and win (Birch, Daxecker, and Höglund, 2020). As Birch, Daxecker, and Höglund (2020) note, however, electoral violence usually occurs within a wider armed conflict. Much of that broader violence is not aimed at the election, yet it still shapes how the contest unfolds and how it turns out.

Research on elections during conflict has documented several such effects. Conflict violence depresses turnout, whether through the displacement of voters (Tezcur, 2015) or by raising the cost of participation (Gallego, 2018). It also moves vote choice: voters withdraw support from the party associated with the perceived perpetrator of violence (Birbir and Gohdes, 2018). As later sections lay out, these effects are not uniform. They depend on the form the violence takes, its intensity, when it occurs, and who is held responsible for it. Among these, one dimension has received less attention: how the effects of conflict on elections differ by gender.

2.1 The Gendered Effects of Conflict

Research on women and conflict has long pulled in two directions. One line documents the economic harms that fall on women as a vulnerable population (Byrne, 1996); another points to the openings that war can create, as the disruption of men’s roles pushes women into work, public life, and forms of organizing previously closed to them (Webster, Chen, and Beardsley, 2019; Shesterinina, 2021). Conflict appears in some accounts to mobilize women into public life and in others to push them out of it.

The mobilizing strand runs largely through collective action. Bellows and Miguel (2006) show that households exposed to more intense war violence are more likely to attend community meetings and join local political groups, and Blattman (2009) finds that exposure to violence raises later community leadership. Conflict can draw

individuals into collective action and new organizational roles, and because these roles often fall to women when men are absent, conflict can catalyze a shift in traditional gender hierarchies. Shesterinina (2021) finds that in the vacuum created by war, women often move into public life as primary breadwinners, NGO leaders, and organizers of grassroots movements. This literature suggests that violence can widen women’s presence in public life by institutionalizing their status as essential social and economic actors.

The opposite pattern dominates once the focus shifts to institutional and electoral politics, where violence has been linked to reduced women’s legislative representation and to women winning fewer seats (Wood, 2024; Hadzic and Tavits, 2021). Stratton, Wright, and Hinojosa (2025) carry this into ongoing conflict, showing that in Afghanistan’s 2010 and 2018 legislative elections, provinces with higher civilian-targeted violence fielded significantly fewer women candidates while the total number of candidates was unaffected. These findings share the deterring direction but differ in where the effect lands: for Wood (2024) and Hadzic and Tavits (2021) violence costs women seats, for Stratton, Wright, and Hinojosa (2025) it keeps them off the ballot.

These opposed findings have been hard to reconcile partly because wartime violence has usually been treated as a single, static condition. The dominant approach compares cross-sections or single time points rather than tracing variation within a conflict (Brück et al., 2016), which leaves open whether immediate and sustained exposure work differently, and whether responsibility for the violence matters for how people respond. Resolving this contradiction involves identifying the channels through which violence affects women’s access to public office, as detailed in the following section.

2.1.1 Supply and Demand Framework for Women’s Access to Office

The contrast between running and winning points to two distinct processes. The first is the supply: whether women are included in the pool of candidates at all, reflecting both women’s ability to run for office and the parties’ willingness to nominate them.

The second is demand: whether the women who run are positioned and supported well enough to win. Both turn largely on choices made by others, such as the party elites who decide whom to field and back, and the voters who decide which parties to reward, not solely on women's own decision to seek office.

Even in ordinary times, the demands of candidacy alongside domestic responsibilities and weaker access to party networks keep fewer women than men in the candidate pool (Lawless and Fox, 2005; Ashworth, Berry, and Mesquita, 2024), and conflict presses on this baseline. When states meet internal threats with militarization, the surrounding climate hardens traditional gender roles and narrows women's access to political power, as societies sort men and women into different security-coded roles (Schroeder, 2017). Sexual and civilian-targeted violence compounds this, through direct victimization by combatants, state forces, and at times peacekeepers (Nordås and Rustad, 2013; Ostby, 2016), and through the additional caregiving that falls to women in affected households. These conditions shrink the pool of women who can run and make party elites more cautious about fielding them. The same pattern appears under criminal violence outside formal civil war. In Mexico, drug cartels attack local candidates and officials to seize control of municipal government (Trejo and Ley, 2021), and across Latin America women candidates face gender-targeted threats that drive them from races (Krook and Restrepo Sanín, 2020). Where violence reaches candidates or public officials, the pool of women able to run narrows.

But conflict can also open paths into politics for women. The threat of conflict-related sexual violence directed at women as a group can generate collective demands for greater representation (Kreft, 2019; Agerberg and Kreft, 2020). War can also loosen rigid gender hierarchies by reshuffling social roles. Women's participation in community organizations during conflict has served as a route into formal politics (Berry, 2018), identities forged among female ex-combatants have aided their later political reintegration (Hauge, 2008), and parties themselves sometimes recruit women instrumentally to signal a break with the status quo (Brannon, 2023).

During active conflict the openings tend to be longer-term and institutional, while the

barriers and the retrenchment of gender norms operate immediately. I therefore expect the net effect during conflict to fall on the side of fewer women entering candidacy:

Hypothesis 1 (H1): *Supply Side Hypothesis: Political violence reduces women's candidacies for public office.*

Once women appear on the ballot, their electoral success depends on two things: whether voters reward the parties that nominate them, and whether party elites give their female candidates serious backing. Violence shapes how voters behave at the polls. It can suppress turnout, as voters avoid the risks of participation (Alacevich and Zejcirovic, 2020), and it raises the salience of security, a domain in which voters tend to read strength and competence as masculine (Lawless, 2004; Sanbonmatsu, 2002). Under these conditions, support tends to flow toward parties seen as strong on security and away from those associated with progressive or equality agendas, which are frequently the parties most willing to advance women (Gatto and Radojevic, 2025). The effect on women's prospects can therefore run through which parties voters favor, and less on any judgment about the women themselves.

Violence also shapes how party elites calculate. Anticipating a security-focused electorate, parties have reason to withhold serious backing from the women they do field, placing them in races and positions where the party expects to lose and reserving competitive slots for candidates read as safe, which can reduce women on the ballot to symbolic inclusions (Falch, 2010). By this route, violence can depress women's success before any vote is cast.

During active conflict, both channels tend to point to the same direction, so I expect violence to lower women's electoral success even where it does not keep them off the ballot:

Hypothesis 2 (H2): *Demand Side Hypothesis: Political violence reduces women's chances of electoral success.*

2.2 Types, Timing and Perpetrators of Violence

Political violence in civil war is not a uniform condition, and treating it as one obscures why the effects documented above point in opposite directions. Following Kalyvas (2006), political violence encompasses lethal and coercive force that armed actors direct at civilians and political figures, including killings, disappearances, torture, sexual violence, and forced displacement. Such violence varies in its form, its intensity, its timing, and its perpetrator, and these different forms and intensities of wartime violence can have opposing effects on women’s empowerment (Savun et al., 2024).

Recent and cumulative exposure are distinct processes that operate on different timescales. Violence in the period just before an election disrupts the established political order, as it unsettles incumbents, networks, and the routines through which access to office is normally controlled. That disruption can briefly widen the field to less established actors, including women, by weakening the arrangements that ordinarily keep them out and by raising the salience of change. Cumulative exposure works in the opposite direction and over a longer horizon. Because people read the threat of new violence through earlier conflict experience and the networks they belong to (Shesterinina, 2021), a long accumulation of violence hardens traditional gender expectations and entrenches a security-focused politics, eroding the conditions under which women win (Williams, Ghimire, and Snedker, 2018). As recent and cumulative violence operate on different timescales and through different processes, they should pull women’s outcomes in opposite directions:

Hypothesis 3 (H3): *Temporal Hypothesis: Recent violence increases women’s electoral success, while cumulative violence reduces it.*

The perpetrator matters because state and insurgent violence reach electoral outcomes through different relationships, as both of them have different repertoires of violence.² State violence sits inside an accountability relationship with voters, and it

²This variation is stark in the Peruvian case: SL accounts for the majority of killings documented by the CVR, while state agents account for most detentions, torture, and sexual violence (see Table B.1).

can move votes in either direction. When a government harms its own citizens, voters can punish incumbents at the polls where a credible opposition exists to absorb that support (De Kadt, Johnson-Kanu, and Sands, 2024). When armed actors align with the state, the flow reverses; in Colombia, paramilitary groups delivered votes to allied candidates and captured races those candidates would otherwise have lost (Acemoglu, Robinson, and Santos, 2013). In both directions, state and state-aligned violence move outcomes through party competition, and there is no particular reason for the resulting shift to favor women, so the imprint on women’s outcomes should be weak.

Insurgent violence works differently. Insurgents stand outside the accountability relationship between government and voters; their violence reaches instead the institutions of local politics, targeting officials, disrupting elections, and weakening the networks through which parties recruit and campaign. This is the disruption that opens the field in Hypothesis 3: the incumbents, routines, and arrangements that insurgent attacks unsettle are the same ones that ordinarily keep less established actors, including women, out of office. State violence leaves this order in place. For instance, in the case of Colombia, killings of women activists in municipalities where the FARC was more present are associated with higher vote shares for women candidates (Rivera, Tappe Ortiz, and Koos, 2025). Both the short-term opening and the long-term erosion should therefore belong to insurgent violence:

Hypothesis 4 (H4): *Perpetrator Hypothesis: These effects are concentrated in insurgent violence rather than state violence.*

Both channels can be read through what violence does to beliefs about whether women are viable candidates. Recent disruption signals that the standing political order is weak, while sustained violence modifies expectations around security and incumbent figures.

3 The Internal Armed Conflict in Peru

The denomination of Internal Armed Conflict (IAC) applied to the Peruvian case began to be officially used by the CVR which acted from 2001 to 2003 to investigate the crimes associated with the violent internal conflict that ranged from Fernando Belaúnde presidency starting in 1980, to the end of Alberto Fujimori’s term in 2000. After twelve years of military rule, known as the Military *docenio*, the 1980s began with the promise of the establishment of a new democratic regime, something that until then was relatively new for the Andean country, which had gone from one authoritarian regime to another. The guerrilla that started along with the first general elections in May 1980 took the country by surprise. A worsening of economic conditions and an escalation of conflict, both at the hands of armed groups and the state, characterized the country in the two following decades.

3.1 Guerrilla Forces in Peru

The Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL) was a Marxist-Maoist group that emerged from a split in the Communist Party of Peru³ toward the end of the 1960s. It originated at the Universidad Nacional de San Cristóbal de Huamanga, where Abimael Guzmán, the undisputed leader of SL, taught. The first attack perpetrated by SL occurred on May 17, 1980, on the eve of the first democratic election after more than a decade of military rule. A group of Senderistas burned electoral materials the day before the general elections in the district of Chuschi, a small rural town in the department of Ayacucho. This attack inaugurated what was known as the “age of terror”, a two-decade violent conflict that involved Sendero’s participation and other extremist groups as well, such as the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru, MRTA). Despite this coexistence with other insurgent groups, 54 percent of all deaths during the conflict are attributed to SL (Hillel and Vergara, 2019).

Some scholars have argued that the SL limited the possibility of a left turn by

³Therefore, also referred to as PCP-SL – Partido Comunista del Perú, Sendero Luminoso.

“creating an emergency situation which resulted in a constitution that locked in a neoliberal economic model [...] with a correspondingly limited electoral democracy” (Cameron, 2019, p. 79). Even when the pernicious effects of SL and the overall guerrilla violence in Peruvian democracy are indisputable and still tangible today, the quantification of these effects in terms of gender inequalities remains to be unveiled. The SL boasted of being one of the few extremist groups with more gender equality within its ranks, where women occupied high positions of power. Even though this was the case to some extent⁴, SL was never a group with aspirations in the institutional arena. Therefore, any advancements by women in the institutional political sphere can hardly be attributed to SL’s cause.

3.2 State and Insurgent Violence


The CVR report acknowledged human rights violations perpetrated by state forces throughout the internal conflict. The state responded late to the political violence that began in 1980, reacting only when insurgent activities became more lethal and visible, and its commitment to human rights declined as the response escalated (Maldonado, Merolla, and Zechmeister, 2019). Guerrilla violence was thus met with a brutal state response that was, in many cases, targeted at the wrong groups. The Sinchis, a special unit within the Peruvian Police created for counterinsurgency, carried out repeated racist and gendered violence against local peasants (Rénique and Lerner, 2019).

Armed actors composed of civilians were also active during the years of the conflict, which mainly consisted of rural self-defense forces known as *comités de autodefensa* (self-defense committees) and *rondas campesinas* (peasant patrols) (Schubiger and Sulmont, 2019). Figure 1 shows the distribution of state killings and SL killings across Peru. The disparities in violence based on demographics and territories show deep and historical divisions within the country (Hillel and Vergara, 2019). SL leveraged local and regional

⁴Some of the leaders and top members of SL were women, although that did not prevent the group from committing severe actions of gender violence, mostly against women in rural communities, many of them underage.

settings, along with the urban-rural divide (Smith, 1994).

Figure 1: Number of Violent Events per District



Note: Information corresponds to violence between the years 1980 to 1995 based on information systematized by Manrique-Vallier, Ball, and Sulmont (2019) on reports from the CVR. The labeled provinces are located as follows: Huamanga, Huanta, and La Mar in Ayacucho department (where Sendero activity started); Leoncio Prado in Huánuco department; and Satipo in Junín department.

The violence did not spare the people who ran local politics. SL's strategy explicitly included assassinating mayors, governors, and community leaders to dismantle the local presence of the state, while counterinsurgency operations swept up local figures suspected of collaboration. The CVR records bear this out. Among records with known occupation, 18.6 percent correspond to authorities and community leaders, and the two sides targeted them through their characteristic means: SL through assassination and the state through detention and torture (see Table B.2). Elections during the conflict were therefore held with the candidates and officeholders themselves under threat.

3.3 Peruvian Municipal Electoral System

Peru's municipal system consists of 1,891 district municipalities as of 2020⁵, each constituting an independent electoral constituency. Municipal elections were held every three years during the conflict period (1980, 1983, 1986, 1989, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2002), with voters electing both a mayor and a municipal council (*regidores distritales*). Municipal councils are composed of 5 to 14 councilors elected for three-year terms, with the exact number determined by district population size (Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales, 2005).

Elections follow a closed-list system with voters casting ballots for political parties, not individual candidates. Council seats are allocated using the D'Hondt proportional representation method, while the mayoral candidate heading the list with the most votes becomes mayor (Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales, 2005). Because voters cannot select individual candidates, variation in women's electoral success across districts operates through party elites' decisions about list composition and positioning and through which lists voters reward, with no votes cast for or against individual women.

The municipal level is also the right arena for observing how violence reaches women's access to office. Municipal elections capture the local political sphere where women's roles in community organizations and social movements would most directly translate into candidacies during ongoing conflict, and each district's small scale means violence and electoral politics unfold in the same communities.

⁵Lambras was the last district created in December 2020 by Law N° 31092. In the 1981 Census, 1,680 districts were documented, increasing to 1,793 for the 1993 Census.

4 Empirical Strategy

This study analyzes municipal elections across Peru’s districts from 1980 to 1995, using the six electoral cycles held during the conflict to identify its effects on women’s political inclusion through variation within districts over time. The analysis stops at 1995 to avoid confounding effects from the gender quota implemented in 1997.

4.1 Data Sources and Variables

Dependent Variables: Women Candidates and their Electoral Success The electoral data come from web-scraping candidate information from Peru’s National Electoral Jury (Jurado Nacional de Elecciones, JNE) online database. The dataset encompasses both mayoral and municipal council candidates across all districts, with each district serving as an independent electoral constituency throughout the analysis period. I coded candidate gender using name-based identification methods.⁶ From these data, I construct two dependent variables: (1) the percentage of women among candidates nominated for office in each election, and (2) the percentage of elected officials who are women in constituencies where at least one woman was a candidate.

Independent Variable: Extent of Political Violence The main independent variable captures the extent of political violence at the district level for municipal elections. I use data from Peru’s CVR systematized by Manrique-Vallier, Ball, and Sulmont (2019), documenting violent events during the internal armed conflict period, including killings, forced disappearances, torture, kidnapping, and sexual violence, with detailed information on victims, perpetrators, and event types. The CVR provides comprehensive and geographically precise documentation of political violence, enabling identification of temporal violence effects.

I construct the violence measure from victim-level records in the CVR database,

⁶Electoral results from 2002 onwards include candidate gender data, which I used to assign gender for 1980-1995 candidates. For the remaining unclassified candidates, I used common name patterns and manual inference. These methods effectively classified 98% of candidates.

where each record corresponds to one act of violence suffered by one identifiable person. The measure therefore incorporates intensity by construction, since an attack with five victims enters the data with five times the weight of an attack with a single victim. I compute the cumulative number of these acts perpetrated by state forces and insurgent groups up to each election year, distinguishing between perpetrator types to test differential effects. The measure enters the models in two forms: (1) recent exposure (acts in the two years before each election) and (2) cumulative exposure (all acts since the conflict began), to examine how different temporal patterns of violence affect women’s political inclusion.

Additional Variables I also control for population (obtained from the 1981 and 1993 census) and sociodemographics at the department and district level, such as percentage of indigenous population and percentage of illiteracy.

4.2 Estimation

I employ a two-way fixed effects estimation strategy that exploits within-district temporal variation in violence exposure across the six electoral cycles. The identification relies on comparing electoral outcomes in the same district during periods of different violence intensity, controlling for time-invariant district characteristics and election-specific shocks.

The empirical approach centers on separating recent from cumulative violence exposure. As set out in the theory section, these are distinct processes expected to pull women’s electoral outcomes in opposite directions, and separating them allows the analysis to test that prediction.

My main specifications estimate:

$$P \text{ women candidates}_{d,t} = \eta_d + \theta_t + \delta_1 \text{Recent Violence}_{d,t} + \delta_2 \text{Cumulative Violence}_{d,t} + \beta_1 \mathbf{X}_{d,t} + \epsilon_{d,t} \quad (1)$$

$$\begin{aligned}
P \text{ women elected}_{d,t} = & \eta_d + \theta_t + \delta_1 \text{Recent Violence}_{d,t} + \\
& \delta_2 \text{Cumulative Violence}_{d,t} + \beta_1 \mathbf{X}_{d,t} + \epsilon_{d,t}
\end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

where *Recent Violence*_{*d,t*} measures violent acts in district *d* during the two years preceding election *t*, and *Cumulative Violence*_{*d,t*} captures total violence exposure since 1980. *P women candidates*_{*d,t*} represents the percentage of female candidates, while *P women elected*_{*d,t*} measures the percentage of women elected among districts where women competed. The coefficients δ_1 and δ_2 identify the effects of recent and cumulative violent acts. Hypothesis 3 predicts opposite signs: $\delta_1 > 0$ if recent violence opens electoral room for women, and $\delta_2 < 0$ if accumulated exposure erodes it.

The district fixed effects η_d control for time-invariant characteristics that correlate with both violence exposure and women's political inclusion. Election-year fixed effects θ_t account for national political dynamics affecting all districts simultaneously. The vector $\mathbf{X}_{d,t}$ includes time-varying controls such as population, indigenous population, and illiteracy rates. Standard errors are clustered at the district level to account for serial correlation.


Additionally, I examine post-conflict electoral patterns from 2002 (the first municipal election after the conflict officially came to an end) onward to explore whether districts with different historical violence exposure show persistent differences in women's political representation. This analysis is descriptive and correlational rather than causal, given intervening institutional changes such as gender quota implementation.

5 Results

5.1 The Effect of Conflict on Female Candidates

The empirical evidence reveals a divergence between the supply and demand channels. Following Figure 2, Hypothesis 1 receives no empirical support, as violence exposure has no discernible effect on the share of women among candidates (panel A). In contrast, there is evidence supporting Hypothesis 2: violence shapes women’s electoral success once they are on the ballot (panel B). Cumulative exposure systematically undermines women’s electoral success, with each additional 100 cumulative violent acts reducing the percentage of women elected by 3.3 percentage points (PP), a robust effect that persists across model specifications (see Table C.1). The effect is driven by a small set of heavily exposed districts. The median district-year records no cumulative violence and the 90th percentile only 12 acts, while at the top percentile of exposure (over 200 acts, see Table B.3) the estimated coefficient implies a reduction of nearly 7 PP, against a baseline of 10.6 percent women elected in districts with women candidates. The effect is also concentrated in lethal violence: when killings and forced disappearances are separated from non-lethal acts, only the lethal measures retain significance in a joint specification (see Table C.4).

Figure 2: Predicted Women’s Candidacies and Electoral Success by Cumulative Violent Acts



Note: Predicted percentage of women candidates (left panel) and women elected (right panel) as a function of cumulative violent acts at the district level. The tick marks on the x-axis indicate the distribution of cumulative violent acts across district-years. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals. Based on pooled OLS models for visualization; main results using fixed effects models available in Table C.1.

Given Peru’s closed-list electoral system, voters select party lists, not individual candidates, so the effect on electoral success could operate through two channels: where parties place women on their lists, and which lists voters reward. The candidate records allow a direct test of the first channel. Constructing placement outcomes from the list ordering in the JNE records, I find that violence moved neither the share of women among mayoral candidates nor their presence in top-2 list positions; the cumulative violence coefficient on top-2 placement is a precisely estimated zero, and the perpetrator split shows the same pattern (SI C.6). This is evidence that parties did not respond to violence by demoting women. With candidacies and placement both unaffected, the effect points to the second channel, i.e., the parties that people voted for.

The composition of the party system provides further evidence in this regard. Table B.4 shows that the largest parties, including Partido Aprista Peruano, Acción Popular, and Partido Popular Cristiano, fielded women at low rates (8.5–9.0%), while smaller regional and independent movements nominated women at substantially higher rates,

some exceeding 35%. Women’s pathway into candidacy ran through these more local, smaller, or newer parties, and their persistence across party types even in violent districts also runs against a simple deterrence account: while the IAC weakened the partisan left through the destruction of party infrastructure and the withdrawal of politicians amid the climate of fear (Levitsky, 2019), women kept entering candidate pools. If violence shifted voter support toward established, security-coded parties and away from the organizations most willing to field women, women’s electoral success would fall exactly as observed.

Whether votes in fact moved this way is not something the electoral returns in my data can show. Sustained exposure to violence may reinforce traditional stereotypes about leadership capacity and security expertise (Glaurdić and Lesschaeve, 2023), which would anchor support to parties coded as strong on security, but the data identify the channel carrying the effect, not the flow of votes within it or the beliefs behind them.


5.2 Temporal Effects

Hypothesis 3 holds that recent and cumulative violence operate as distinct processes pulling in opposite directions, and the results bear this out for electoral success. Table C.2 shows that recent violence (1–2 years before an election) increases women’s electoral success, older violence (3–5 years) shows no effect, and cumulative violence interacted with years since first exposure shows increasingly negative effects. The pattern appears exclusively on the demand side: the interaction term is significant for elected women but not for candidates, consistent with the null supply-side results throughout. Violence in the period just before an election opens brief electoral room for women, while the accumulated weight of violence closes it.

Figure 3 shows the marginal effect of cumulative violence at different temporal distances from a district’s first violent act. For women candidates (circles), the marginal effect remains flat near zero throughout the entire period. For women elected (triangles), it starts near zero at initial exposure and becomes increasingly negative, reaching approximately -0.03 PP per violent act by 15 years after first exposure. As expected, the magnitude depends on exposure. For most districts, the implied effect is

negligible, since the median district-year records no violence at all. In the hardest-hit districts, it is severe: at the 99th percentile of exposure, over 200 acts, a slope of -0.03 PP per act implies a reduction of more than 6 PP in the share of women elected. Against a baseline of 10.6 percent women elected in districts with women candidates, prolonged exposure at that level erases over half of women’s presence among elected officials, while leaving lightly exposed districts largely unaffected.

Figure 3: Marginal Effects of Cumulative Violence over Time



Note: Marginal effects of cumulative violent acts on women’s candidacies and electoral success as years pass since a district’s first violent act. Circles represent effects on the percentage of women candidates; triangles represent effects on the percentage of women elected (conditional on districts with women candidates). Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals. All models include district and year fixed effects with standard errors clustered at the district level. Full models available in Table C.2.


5.3 Type of Actor

Are these results driven by the perpetrator of the violence? Hypothesis 4 holds that the temporal pattern in Hypothesis 3 is concentrated in insurgent rather than state violence, and the results in Table C.3 support it. Recent SL violence increases women’s electoral success by 0.35 PP per act and their candidacies by 0.04 PP, while cumulative SL violence reduces electoral success by 0.15 PP per act. Recent state violence shows no significant effect on either outcome. The recent-positive, cumulative-negative pattern documented for violence overall is a SL pattern: the actor that dismantled the local

political order produced both the short-lived opening and the lasting erosion of women’s electoral prospects, while violence embedded in the state’s accountability relationship with voters left little imprint. Figure 4 shows the contrast. In Panel B, recent SL violence sits far to the right while cumulative SL violence sits clearly to the left of zero, the temporal divergence from Hypothesis 3 reproduced within a single perpetrator.

One result falls outside the perpetrator asymmetry. Cumulative state violence shows a positive and significant effect on both outcomes (0.010 on candidacies, 0.062 on electoral success, as shown in Figure 4), a pattern the framework does not predict. The coefficients are modest, well under half the size of the corresponding cumulative SL effects, so the perpetrator asymmetry at the center of Hypothesis 4 stands.

Figure 4: Estimated Effects of Violence by Perpetrator Type



Note: Coefficient estimates for violence by perpetrator type on women’s political inclusion. Panel A shows effects on the percentage of women candidates; Panel B shows effects on the percentage of women elected (conditional on districts with women candidates). Recent violence refers to acts in the two years preceding each election; cumulative violence refers to total acts since 1980. Thick lines represent 90% confidence intervals; thin lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Panels are scaled differently. All models include district and year fixed effects with standard errors clustered at the district level. Full models available in Table C.3.

5.4 Lingering Effects

As Hadzic and Tavits (2021) argue, people may perceive post-war politics as more combative and aggressive, which could keep women out of electoral politics after

conflict termination. Peruvian electoral data do not record turnout by sex⁷, so whether women’s electoral participation fell after the conflict cannot be measured directly. What can be assessed is whether the conflict’s effects on women’s electoral outcomes persisted after it ended.

Using 2002 as the first post-conflict election⁸, and electoral data from six municipal elections spanning 2002 to 2022 consisting of 433,164 candidates from 2,771 parties, I examine whether districts with higher violence exposure continue to show reduced women’s political inclusion two decades after the conflict ended. The recent-positive pattern from the conflict period does not survive it: while recent Sendero violence opened short-term electoral room for women during the 1980s and 1990s, only the negative cumulative effects persist. Table 1 shows that SL violence reduces women’s electoral success by 0.027 PP and women’s presence in competitive list positions (top-2) by 0.024 PP per violent act. The placement effect marks a break with the conflict period, when violence left list positions untouched (SI C.6); the mark on where women appear on lists emerged only after the fighting ended. State violence shows no significant effects on any post-conflict outcome.

These effects are meaningful in both magnitude and duration. Districts with extensive SL violence (100 or more acts) show women’s electoral disadvantages 2 to 3 PP larger than peaceful districts. The disruption that produced short-term openings during active conflict faded, while the changes that disadvantage women endured. These results are consistent with recent research finding that insurgent violence weighs on women’s political inclusion through fears of retaliation from armed groups and increased demand for masculine norms in politics (Rivera, Tappe Ortiz, and Koos, 2025). They also run alongside García-Ponce (2022), who finds that the 1997 quota raised women’s candidacies for local councilor more in municipalities exposed to the insurgency, an effect that persists through the 2002, 2006, and 2010 elections. Read

⁷Unlike countries such as Chile, where gender-segregated polling stations made turnout by sex observable until 2012.

⁸When the CVR was created in the year 2001, it was mandated to investigate the crimes committed between 1980 and 2000, setting 2000 as the endpoint.

together with the results here, the two describe a conflict legacy that reaches entry into candidacy and election to office in opposite ways. Exposure to insurgent violence is associated with more women entering candidacy and with fewer women reaching office once they do, which is the same separation between supply and demand that the conflict-period results document.

Table 1: Violence Effects on Women’s Political Inclusion in the Post-Conflict Period (2002-2022)

	Women Elected (%)	Women Mayors (%)	Women Top List (%)
State Violence	−0.005 (0.018)	−0.019 (0.016)	−0.018 (0.018)
Sendero Violence	−0.027** (0.013)	−0.017 (0.013)	−0.024* (0.014)
District Size	−0.139 (0.413)	0.346 (0.224)	0.501** (0.194)
Number of Parties	0.168** (0.066)	0.467*** (0.061)	0.277*** (0.050)
Num.Obs.	9609	9608	9609
R^2	0.468	0.333	0.652
R^2 Adj.	0.367	0.206	0.585
FE Districts	✓	✓	✓
FE Year	✓	✓	✓

Note: Dependent variables: percentage of women among elected officials (Column 1), percentage of women as mayor candidates (Column 2), and percentage of women in top-2 list positions (Column 3). Violence measures based on cumulative acts across the full conflict period. Standard errors clustered at the district level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

The post-conflict results confirm the perpetrator asymmetry at the paper’s center. The legacy of the conflict on women’s electoral outcomes is a SL legacy: it persists across six post-conflict elections and through the gender quota introduced in 1997, while state violence leaves no comparable trace. The lasting disadvantage runs through the violence that dismantled local political orders, not the violence embedded in state-society relations, and the institutional reform designed to open office to women did not offset it. Electoral competition provides a partial counterweight, with each additional party increasing women’s presence across outcomes by 0.17 to 0.47 PP, so

more competitive partisan environments compensate for some of what the violence legacies impose. Conflict reshaped Peru's political landscape in ways that continue to disadvantage women selectively, by perpetrator and by district, long after peace was formally established.

6 Conclusion

This study examines how political violence affected women’s political inclusion during Peru’s Internal Armed Conflict. Using municipal fixed effects models that exploit within-district variation across six electoral cycles from 1980 to 1995, I find that violence affects women’s electoral success, not their presence among candidates. The null effects on candidacy rates run against the supply-side expectation and against the candidacy contraction documented for other contexts (e.g., Stratton, Wright, and Hinojosa, 2025), while the effects on electoral outcomes locate the barrier at the demand side. The closed-list system allows this barrier to be traced further. Testing the placement channel, I find that violence moved neither the share of women heading lists nor their presence in top positions: parties did not respond to violence by burying women on their lists. With candidacies and placement both unaffected, the effect points to which parties voters supported.

The results by timing and perpetrator add detail to these findings. Recent violence opens short-term electoral room for women, while cumulative exposure closes it, confirming that immediate and accumulated violence are distinct processes. Both sides of the pattern belong to Sendero Luminoso: recent insurgent violence raises women’s electoral success and candidacies, cumulative insurgent violence lowers both, and recent state violence moves neither outcome, in line with accounts that tie the electoral consequences of violence to its perpetrator (Birnir and Gohdes, 2018).

The most consequential finding is that these legacies outlast the conflict, and they do so selectively. In post-conflict elections from 2002 to 2022, the short-term opening associated with recent Sendero violence disappears while the cumulative penalty endures. Districts with heavy exposure to Sendero violence show reduced electoral success for women and reduced access to competitive list positions across six electoral cycles, despite the gender quota introduced in 1997. State violence leaves no comparable trace. The effect on list placement appears only after the conflict, given that during the fighting placement was untouched and violence reached women’s outcomes through which parties voters rewarded. What violence briefly opened faded with the conflict, but what it closed

outlasted it.

Two questions remain open for future research. The first is why acute insurgent violence widened electoral room for women while its accumulation narrowed it. Answering it requires evidence the electoral record used here does not contain, such as archival material on Sendero's targeting of local authorities or party records showing how organizations rebuilt lists after attacks. The second is the positive effect of cumulative state violence, which the framework does not predict. Explaining it would require finer data on state violence than the CVR records provide, distinguishing its forms or its visibility to communities.

The analysis also shows that electoral competition benefits women's inclusion, with each additional competing party increasing women's presence among elected officials, mayoral candidacies, and top list positions. More open party environments partly compensate for the barriers that violence legacies impose. Two implications follow for post-conflict policy. Because the supply of women candidates held steady even under intense violence, the barrier lies after recruitment, in the support voters give the parties that field women once lists are formed. And because the lasting penalty is tied to a specific perpetrator and concentrated in specific districts, efforts to rebuild women's political inclusion should target the areas marked by insurgent violence, over horizons longer than immediate post-conflict reconstruction, since these effects persisted for two decades and through an institutional reform designed to correct them (Aoláin, Haynes, and Cahn, 2011).

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Supplementary Information

Guerrilla Shadows on Gender: The Lingering Effects of the Peruvian Internal Armed Conflict on Women's Political Inclusion

August 2026

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A Elections in Peru

Peru's return to democracy in 1980 marked a significant expansion of electoral participation compared to the previous democratic period. In the 1963 presidential and congressional elections, the last ones held before the military dictatorship, only literate citizens older than 21 years could vote (18 years for married and emancipated individuals), with voting becoming optional at age 60. The 1980 democratic transition brought universal suffrage: all men and women older than 18 years gained voting rights, including illiterate citizens, with optional voting beginning at age 70 (Aragón, Cruz, and Sánchez, 2019). This electoral expansion occurred alongside the establishment of regular elections, which had been suspended during military rule.

A.1 Distrital Elections in Peru

Following the end of military dictatorship in 1979 and the promulgation of a new constitution by the Constituent Assembly, Peru restored local elections in 1980 alongside congressional elections. This marked the return of democratic governance at the municipal level after years of military rule. The political configuration that emerged from this democratic transition was characterized by three main political forces: the AP-PPC (Alianza Popular-Partido Popular Cristiano) bloc, the *Aprismo* (linked to Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana, APRA), and the left grouped in the Izquierda Unida bloc (Bensa Morales, 2002).

Peru's municipal system operates through district-level elections held every three years. Municipal councils consist of mayors and *regidores* (councilors), with council size ranging from 6 to 40 members depending on the district's territorial jurisdiction. Elections follow a closed-list system where voters select party lists rather than individual candidates. The candidate heading the list that receives the most votes becomes mayor, while *regidores* are allocated using the D'Hondt proportional method for lists receiving more than 5% of votes.

B Descriptive Statistics

B.1 CVR Statistics

The CVR data are publicly archived at the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.¹ Each record is one act of violence committed against one identified person at a specific time and place, drawn from the Commission’s reconstruction and classification of events. A person who suffered acts at different moments appears in more than one record, so the analysis counts acts.

Table B.1 reports the records drawn from the CVR data by type of violence and perpetrator. The sample comprises 34,122 records. A single record can carry more than one type, so the counts in the N column sum to more than the number of records and the shares do not partition the sample. Killings are the most frequent type at 32 percent, followed by detention at 21.6 percent, torture at 17.6 percent, and forced disappearance at 15 percent. The perpetrator columns give the share of each type attributed to Sendero Luminoso and to state agents; these categories omit some actors and are not mutually exclusive, so the two shares do not sum to 100. The split points to the perpetrator asymmetry that the paper builds on: Sendero accounts for the majority of killings and forced recruitment, while state agents account for most detentions, torture, and sexual violence.

The CVR data record each victim’s occupation at the time of the act, including whether the person held a state authority position or a leadership role in a community or political organization. These records show that local political figures were direct targets of the violence. Among the 18,349 records with known occupation, 3,410 (18.6 percent) correspond to authorities and local leaders.² Table B.2 breaks these records down by

¹Available at <https://sites.google.com/a/pucp.pe/informe-final-de-la-cvr--peru/>. The archived data reflect the state of the CVR database as of 11 August 2003. My measure is built from the act-level file (`actos_est`), which covers 70 percent of the testimonies the Commission received. I keep acts occurring through 1995 and drop records the Commission could locate only at the province or department level, since the analysis is at the district level.

²Occupation is unrecorded for 46 percent of records; all shares in this section are computed on records with known occupation.

Table B.1: CVR records by type of violence, perpetrator, and victim sex

Type of violence	All records		Sendero		State		Female victims	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Killings	10911	32.0	6837	62.7	3061	28.1	2451	22.5
Detention	7365	21.6	0	0.0	7270	98.7	1332	18.1
Torture	5990	17.6	1401	23.4	4254	71.0	1173	19.6
Forced disappearance	5132	15.0	1634	31.8	3090	60.2	773	15.1
Forced recruitment	555	1.6	481	86.7	40	7.2	97	17.5
Sexual violence	515	1.5	61	11.8	414	80.4	504	97.9

Note: N is the count of records of each type. The % column under “All records” is the share of the 34,122 records in the sample. The % columns under “Sendero” and “State” give the share of each type attributed to that perpetrator. The columns under “Female victims” give the count and share of each type with a female victim; 43 records with missing victim sex are excluded from these counts. Detention refers to the CVR’s classification of state-style detention; captivity by insurgent groups is coded separately as kidnapping and is not included among the six types shown.

type of violence and perpetrator. The two sides targeted authorities through different means. Killings account for 45.3 percent of authority records and are overwhelmingly attributed to Sendero Luminoso (80.3 percent), consistent with its documented strategy of assassinating mayors and local authorities to dismantle local state presence. State agents account for nearly all detentions of authorities (99.1 percent) and a majority of torture (57.1 percent), targeting local figures through repression instead of assassination. Attacks on local political figures were therefore a substantial feature of the conflict, and the actor most responsible for killing them was the one the analysis identifies as driving the effects on women’s electoral outcomes.

Table B.2: CVR records of violence against authorities and local leaders

Type of violence	All authority victims		Sendero		State	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Killings	1456	45.3	1169	80.3	174	12.0
Torture	695	21.6	265	38.1	397	57.1
Detention	558	17.4	0	0.0	553	99.1
Forced disappearance	488	15.2	204	41.8	247	50.6
Forced recruitment	9	0.3	7	77.8	2	22.2
Sexual violence	7	0.2	0	0.0	7	100.0

Note: Authority victims are records where the victim held a state authority position or a leadership role in a community or political organization at the time of the act. The % column under “All authority victims” gives each type of violence as a share of type flags among authority records; records may carry more than one type. The % columns under “Sendero” and “State” give the share of each type attributed to that perpetrator. Detention refers to the CVR’s classification of state-style detention; captivity by insurgent groups is coded separately as kidnapping.

Table B.3: Distribution of violence measures across district-years

Measure	Share zero	Mean	p50	p75	p90	p95	p99	Max
Recent violent acts	0.86	1.8	0	0	2	6	38	846
Cumulative violent acts	0.74	9.4	0	1	12	38	208	1552
Cumulative Sendero acts	0.82	3.8	0	0	4	14	80	599
Cumulative state acts	0.82	5.0	0	0	6	18	119	867

Note: Recent acts are those in the two years before each election; cumulative acts are all acts since 1980. Percentile columns give the value of each measure at that percentile of the distribution.

B.2 Electoral Statistics

Table B.4 covers all candidates in the six district municipal elections held between 1980 and 1995, pooling mayoral and council candidacies. Totals therefore reflect a party's presence across the whole period: national parties fielded lists in most districts in most elections, while regional and independent movements appear in fewer districts and fewer years. The lower panel is restricted to parties with at least 100 candidates across the full period, since parties fielding only a handful of candidates produce unstable shares.

Table B.4: Parties with most candidates and women candidates

Party	Total	Women	Proportion
Top 5 by Total Candidates			
Partido Aprista Peruano	27540	2339	0.085
Acción Popular	20812	1759	0.085
Partido Popular Cristiano	10484	944	0.090
Izquierda Unida	9963	549	0.055
Frente Electoral Izquierda Unida	5999	337	0.056
Top 5 by Women Proportion			
Lista Indep. Frenatraca	141	54	0.383
Movimiento Regional Arequipa Unida	303	111	0.366
Partido Democrático Somos Perú	163	58	0.356
Fuerza Democrática	211	75	0.355
Alianza Electoral Unidad Nacional	126	44	0.349

C Full Results

C.1 Main Results: The Effect of Conflict on Female Candidates

Table C.1: Main Results: The Effect of Conflict on Female Political Inclusion

	Candidates		Elected	
	Basic	Full	Basic	Full
Recent Violence	0.004 (0.006)	0.005 (0.006)	0.085*** (0.030)	0.084*** (0.031)
Cumulative Violence	-0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.033*** (0.007)	-0.033*** (0.007)
Log Population		0.378** (0.178)		0.435 (0.341)
Literacy Rate (%)		0.000 (0.020)		-0.019 (0.053)
Indigenous Language (%)		-0.004 (0.011)		0.010 (0.028)
Num.Obs.	11 238	9213	4067	3538
R^2	0.351	0.353	0.425	0.431
R^2 Adj.	0.221	0.213	0.123	0.118
FE District	✓	✓	✓	✓
FE Year	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: Dependent variables: Columns 1-2 show percentage of women candidates; Columns 3-4 show percentage of women elected (conditional on women candidates). Standard errors clustered at district level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

C.2 Temporal Effects

Table C.2: Temporal Effects of Violence on Women's Political Inclusion

	Women Candidates	Women Elected
Violence 1-2 Years Ago	0.003 (0.006)	0.057** (0.028)
Violence 3-5 Years Ago	0.003 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.010)
Cumulative Violence $\times$ Years Since First Violence	0.000 (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)
Num.Obs.	11 238	4067
R^2	0.351	0.425
R^2 Adj.	0.220	0.123
FE District	✓	✓
FE Year	✓	✓

Note: Standard errors clustered at the district level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

C.3 Type of Perpetrator

Table C.3: Violence Effects by Perpetrator Type on Women's Political Inclusion

	Women Candidates		Women Elected	
	Basic	Full	Basic	Full
Recent State Violence	−0.013 (0.011)	−0.015 (0.012)	−0.018 (0.062)	−0.047 (0.058)
Recent Sendero Violence	0.035* (0.019)	0.039** (0.019)	0.317*** (0.102)	0.354*** (0.102)
Cumulative State Violence	0.007 (0.004)	0.010** (0.005)	0.032 (0.028)	0.062** (0.025)
Cumulative Sendero Violence	−0.011** (0.005)	−0.014** (0.007)	−0.122*** (0.029)	−0.154*** (0.027)
Log Population		0.382** (0.179)		0.427 (0.350)
Literacy Rate (%)		−0.001 (0.020)		−0.023 (0.053)
Indigenous Language (%)		−0.003 (0.011)		0.010 (0.027)
Num.Obs.	11 238	9213	3811	3273
R^2	0.351	0.353	0.392	0.391
R^2 Adj.	0.221	0.213	0.130	0.125
FE District	✓	✓	✓	✓
FE Year	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: Dependent variables: Columns 1–2 show percentage of women candidates; Columns 3–4 show percentage of women elected (conditional on women candidates). Standard errors clustered at district level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

C.4 Type of Violence

Table C.4: Fatal and Non-Fatal Violence

	Candidates			Elected		
	Fatal	Non-Fatal	Joint	Fatal	Non-Fatal	Joint
Recent Fatal Violence	0.007 (0.011)		0.038** (0.016)	0.160* (0.082)		0.235*** (0.064)
Cumulative Fatal Violence	0.000 (0.003)		-0.003 (0.007)	-0.058*** (0.011)		-0.106*** (0.027)
Recent Non-Fatal Violence		0.004 (0.014)	-0.039** (0.019)		0.141 (0.102)	-0.148 (0.121)
Cumulative Non-Fatal Violence		-0.001 (0.005)	0.003 (0.009)		-0.072*** (0.024)	0.068 (0.046)
Log Population	0.377** (0.178)	0.379** (0.178)	0.382** (0.179)	0.390 (0.343)	0.417 (0.341)	0.444 (0.343)
Literacy Rate (%)	0.000 (0.020)	0.000 (0.020)	0.000 (0.020)	-0.016 (0.053)	-0.016 (0.053)	-0.023 (0.053)
Indigenous Language (%)	-0.004 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.011)	0.012 (0.028)	0.012 (0.028)	0.010 (0.028)
Num.Obs.	9213	9213	9213	3273	3273	3273
R^2	0.353	0.353	0.353	0.386	0.386	0.388
R^2 Adj.	0.213	0.213	0.213	0.119	0.119	0.122
FE District	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
FE Year	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: Fatal violence combines killings and forced disappearances; non-fatal violence combines detention, torture, and sexual violence from CVR data. Categories are not mutually exclusive at the record level. Columns 1–3: all districts. Columns 4–6: districts with at least one woman candidate. Standard errors clustered at district level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

C.5 Gendered Violence

The CVR data record the sex of each victim. Women account for 21.3 percent of the 34,122 records in the sample, a share that is fairly stable across types of violence, from 15.1 percent of forced disappearances to 22.5 percent of killings, with one exception: 97.9 percent of sexual violence records have female victims. Sexual violence is the most sharply gendered form of violence in the data, though it represents a small share of total records (1.5 percent, see Table B.1) and is likely undercounted given the documented underreporting of sexual violence to truth commissions.

Table C.5 splits the violence measure by victim sex and estimates the main specification with each measure separately and with both jointly. Estimated separately, violence against women reproduces the temporal pattern from the main analysis: recent violence against women increases women’s electoral success (0.323 PP per act) and cumulative violence against women reduces it (-0.134 PP per act). Violence against men shows the same pattern with smaller coefficients. Neither measure affects candidacies. Because the two measures are highly correlated across districts ($r = 0.90$ for the cumulative measures), the joint specification cannot attribute the effects to violence against one sex rather than the other. Both measures reproduce the pattern independently, so the effects documented in the main analysis reflect exposure to violence in the district rather than the sex composition of its victims.

Table C.5: Violence Against Women and Against Men

	Candidates			Elected		
	Female Victims	Male Victims	Joint	Female Victims	Male Victims	Joint
Recent Violence	0.005 (0.016)		−0.065* (0.036)	0.323*** (0.108)		0.272** (0.115)
Cumulative Violence	0.001 (0.006)		0.014 (0.012)	−0.134*** (0.038)		0.078 (0.102)
Recent Violence		0.008 (0.009)	0.031* (0.018)		0.101** (0.041)	0.035 (0.050)
Cumulative Violence		−0.001 (0.002)	−0.006 (0.005)		−0.040*** (0.010)	−0.052** (0.022)
Log Population	0.378** (0.178)	0.379** (0.178)	0.377** (0.178)	0.413 (0.342)	0.436 (0.341)	0.442 (0.342)
Literacy Rate (%)	0.000 (0.020)	0.000 (0.020)	−0.001 (0.020)	−0.019 (0.053)	−0.019 (0.053)	−0.021 (0.053)
Indigenous Language (%)	−0.004 (0.011)	−0.004 (0.011)	−0.004 (0.011)	0.011 (0.028)	0.010 (0.028)	0.010 (0.028)
Num.Obs.	9213	9213	9213	3273	3273	3273
R^2	0.353	0.353	0.353	0.387	0.387	0.388
R^2 Adj.	0.213	0.213	0.213	0.120	0.121	0.121
FE District	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
FE Year	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: Violence measures count victim-level records by victim sex; 43 records with missing victim sex are excluded from both measures. Columns 1–3: all districts. Columns 4–6: districts with at least one woman candidate. Standard errors clustered at district level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

C.6 List Placement

The closed-list system means the effects on women’s electoral success could operate through two channels: where parties place women on their lists, and which lists voters reward. The candidate records allow a direct test of the first channel. Because candidates appear in the JNE records in list order, with the mayoral candidate heading each list, I construct two placement outcomes at the district-year level: the percentage of women among mayoral candidates and the percentage of women in top-2 list positions (alcalde and first regidor). Position is defined for party lists with a registered mayoral candidate, which covers 92 to 97 percent of lists in the 1983–1993 elections and less in 1980 and 1995, where the records are incomplete; this coverage is uncorrelated with violence exposure ($r = 0.01$).

Table C.6 shows that violence did not move either outcome. The cumulative violence coefficient on top-2 positions is -0.001 , a precisely estimated zero against a sample mean of 4.6 percent, and the perpetrator split shows the same pattern, with no effect of cumulative Sendero violence on placement despite its strong negative effect on women’s electoral success. Women’s presence on lists and their position within them held steady in violent districts.

Table C.6: Violence and Women's List Placement, 1980–1995

	Total Violence		By Perpetrator	
	Women Mayor (%)	Women Top-2 (%)	Women Mayor (%)	Women Top-2 (%)
Recent Violence	0.027 (0.028)	0.016 (0.015)		
Cumulative Violence	−0.004 (0.004)	−0.001 (0.002)		
Log Population	0.626 (0.447)	0.370 (0.311)	0.624 (0.447)	0.367 (0.311)
Literacy Rate (%)	0.010 (0.042)	0.006 (0.034)	0.010 (0.042)	0.005 (0.034)
Indigenous Language (%)	−0.039* (0.022)	−0.027 (0.017)	−0.039* (0.022)	−0.026 (0.017)
Recent State Violence			0.053 (0.039)	0.021 (0.023)
Recent Sendero Violence			−0.017 (0.066)	0.011 (0.037)
Cumulative State Violence			−0.003 (0.014)	0.011 (0.010)
Cumulative Sendero Violence			−0.006 (0.018)	−0.015 (0.012)
Num.Obs.	6655	6655	6655	6655
R^2	0.259	0.271	0.259	0.271
R^2 Adj.	0.065	0.080	0.065	0.079
FE District	✓	✓	✓	✓
FE Year	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: Dependent variables: percentage of women among mayoral candidates (Columns 1 and 3) and among top-2 list positions, alcalde plus first regidor (Columns 2 and 4). Standard errors clustered at district level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

References

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