Do memory sites influence far-right vote? Evidence from Chile

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Abstract

Chile maintains a comprehensive registry of more than 1,000 memory sites linked to human rights violations during the Pinochet dictatorship. In this paper, I examine whether proximity to memory sites affects far-right electoral support. Using a difference-in-differences design that compares voting locations near memory sites to those farther away between the 2021 and 2025 presidential elections, I find that proximity to memory sites reduces the far-right *Partido Republicano* vote share by 0.9–1.7 percentage points within 1km of a site, which amounts to up to 6 percent of the party's 2021 vote share. At the same time, the *Partido Nacional Libertario*, a more recently founded far-right party with more populist overtones than authoritarian nostalgia, performs better near memory sites. These findings complicate the notion that official commemoration of past authoritarian violence deters far-right electoral appeal. Memory sites penalize the party most directly tied to the dictatorship, while a populist far-right alternative performs better in the same locations and offsets part of that loss.

Keywords: memory sites, human rights violations, far-right voting, electoral behavior, Chile

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Since the third wave of democratization, authoritarian successor parties have been key actors, frequently voted into office despite their ties to past nondemocratic regimes (Loxton and Mainwaring, 2018). More recently, far-right parties have gained ground across democracies worldwide. These parties have been much more outspoken in their defense of past dictatorships, going so far as to justify or even deny human rights violations committed by those regimes (Faber, 2023). As many countries are still grappling with reparations for abuses perpetrated during periods of authoritarianism, it becomes relevant to understand the relationship between specific forms of reparations (notably memory sites) and far-right appeal. Memory sites function as markers of locations of state violence that took place during authoritarian regimes and are designed to serve as a democratic response to this legacy (Aguilera and Badilla, 2022). Could these memory sites affect the appeal of political parties that cast doubt on such abuses and question commemorations of victims?

Policies of remembrance are a key factor in assessing far-right parties' legitimacy (Sierp, 2025). Far-right parties challenge mainstream, institutionalized historical references by promoting unauthorized and counter-hegemonic versions of the past (Couperus, Tortola, and Rensmann, 2023). Evidence on whether reminders of a repressive past reduce electoral support for far-right parties is mixed. Exposure to reminders of authoritarian abuses might strengthen democratic norms and reduce support for parties associated with that past (Balcells, Palanza, and Voytas, 2022; Ruipérez Núñez and Sauter, 2025). Alternatively, commemorations of past atrocities could have a minimal electoral impact if citizens view historical abuses as disconnected from current politics (Aguilera and Badilla, 2022; Sierp, 2025), or even induce a 'memory satiation effect', increasing the far-right vote (Hoerner, Jaax, and Rodon, 2019).

An empirical challenge lies in establishing whether any observed relationship reflects the true influence of memory sites and not selection effects instead, as these locations are not randomly distributed. For instance, torture centers might have been strategically placed during dictatorships in areas with particular political or geographic characteristics (Bautista et al., 2018) that could independently affect voting patterns and therefore far-right vote share. Moreover, decisions about which sites to preserve and designate as memory centers have themselves been political, which could be linked to existing local attitudes (Malinova, 2021).

This paper addresses these challenges by examining voting patterns in relation to sites of torture and human rights violations during the Pinochet dictatorship (1973-1990) in Chile.

These sites, some of them now preserved as museums and memory spaces (*espacios de memoria*), mark locations where thousands were detained, tortured, and disappeared. The government of Gabriel Boric (2022-2026) made substantial efforts to recover and protect these memory sites, surpassing previous administrations' initiatives in both scope and visibility.[1] Exploiting the sharp increase in the political salience of these sites between the 2021 and 2025 elections, I explore whether proximity to memory sites affects the electoral support of the Partido Republicano de Chile (PRCh), a far-right party founded in 2019 from a division of the traditional right-wing party Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI). Since its inception, the PRCh has adopted an anti-immigration rhetoric, cultural conservatism, and explicitly refuses to condemn (and even recognize) human rights violations that occurred during Pinochet's dictatorship. This nostalgic affiliation with the authoritarian past is a key underpinning of the party's political identity and policy positions (Rovira Kaltwasser, Salas-Lewin, and Zanotti, 2024; Zanotti, 2026). In 2024, the PRCh itself experienced a split, with the formation of the Partido Nacional Libertario (PNL), further broadening the spectrum of the Chilean party system to the right. These changes also allow me to test whether proximity to memory sites affects traditional right-wing parties, such as UDI, differently from newer far-right parties.

Using the official geolocation of former torture centers and sites where human rights abuses were committed during the dictatorship, I combine proximity measures with precinct-level electoral results to examine whether living near a memory site affected the change in far-right voting between the 2021 and 2025 presidential elections. Chile's electoral system assigns voters to polling places based on their registered residential address, enabling the measurement of exposure to nearby memory sites. I find that voting locations within 1km of a memory site show reductions in PRCh vote share of approximately 0.9–1.7 percentage points (PP) relative to locations more than 1km away, which amounts to up to 6 percent of the party's 2021 vote share. Conversely, PNL vote share is 0.7 PP higher within 250m of a site. This pattern is consistent with electoral substitution toward a strand of the far right less explicitly associated with the dictatorship, although the PNL gains offset only part of the PRCh losses, and combined

[1] This change was linked to the announcement made in the Government's public account of 2022, in anticipation of the 50th anniversary of the military coup. Through the exempt resolution (*resolución exenta*) N°111 published in 2023, the Program of Sites of Memory was officially approved. In 2024, the Government confirmed that 20 Sites of Memory had been newly designated as historical monuments under this program. See https://www.gob.cl/noticias/gobierno-recuperado-entregado-20-sitios-memoria/.

far-right support still falls by roughly 1 PP at the closest distances.

I argue that memory sites operate by keeping past abuses locally salient, making voters more wary of the PRCh's ties to the Pinochet regime. Consistent with this mechanism, the PRCh decline concentrates near sites where violations occurred, and is strongest in presidential races, where the party label and its leader are most visible. Research on Holocaust memorials in Germany reports a similar dampening effect on AfD support (Turkoglu, Ditlmann, and Firestone, 2023), and this paper extends that literature to a context where far-right parties maintain more direct rhetorical connections to the authoritarian past.

Context: Memory Sites in Chile

Transitional justice policies recognize the role of physical spaces in confronting authoritarian pasts, encompassing symbolic transitional justice policies that acknowledge victims collectively by establishing spaces of memory, memorials, or museums (Aguilera and Badilla, 2022; Balcells, Palanza, and Voytas, 2022). Memory sites, taken as places marking locations of state violence, serve multiple functions in post-authoritarian societies: they provide symbolic reparation to victims, create spaces for public acknowledgment of past abuses, and offer opportunities for societies to reckon with difficult histories (Hite and Collins, 2009). These sites represent contested spaces where power relations and competing narratives about the past are negotiated (Aguilera and Badilla, 2022), and therefore are not neutral markers. The transformation of former detention and torture centers into memory sites is a particular form of memorialization that confronts visitors with the physical locations where violence occurred, potentially making past abuses more tangible than abstract monuments or museums located elsewhere.

Chile represents a notable case of transitional justice implementation. It has established two truth commissions, provided reparations to victims and their families, and created a national Museum of Memory and Human Rights in 2010 (Aguilera and Badilla, 2022; Infante Batiste, 2024). The 1991 Truth and Reconciliation Commission documented over 3,000 people executed or disappeared during the dictatorship, while the 2004 Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture officially acknowledged that over 40,000 people were tortured and identified more than 1,100 detention and torture centers across the country (Cornejo et al., 2020). Following these reports, the state, in collaboration with civil society, began designating certain sites as

historical monuments, such as the emblematic Villa Grimaldi in 2004 and Londres 38 in 2005. These processes were driven by bottom-up activism from victims' organizations demanding recognition, combined with state support that increased substantially after 2004 (Aguilera and Badilla, 2022).

The geographical distribution of these memory sites reflects the dictatorship's repressive apparatus, with torture centers located in both urban and rural areas (see Table D.8). Unlike centralized museums that visitors must intentionally seek out, these neighborhood-based sites occupy everyday spaces where residents live, work, and vote. The government of Gabriel Boric expanded the official recognition of these sites, designating more of them as historical monuments than any prior administration. This emphasis on memory site recognition coincides with growing concerns about far-right political mobilization and attacks on human rights memorials. Some memory sites have been vandalized or even destroyed, such as the House of Human Rights in Punta Arenas, which was intentionally set on fire in 2020 (Díaz, 2020), while others have been on the verge of being demolished[2], revealing persistent divisions over how Chile should remember its authoritarian past.

Understanding whether proximity to memory sites shapes political behavior matters for several reasons. First, it speaks to ongoing debates about the effectiveness of transitional justice beyond the immediate post-transition period. If memory sites reduce support for parties associated with authoritarian legacies decades after a democratic transition, it could suggest that physical memorialization can have lasting political effects. Second, Chile's experience may inform other post-authoritarian societies grappling with how to address their pasts and how to slow down the electoral advances of the far-right. Third, as far-right parties gain ground globally, often by downplaying or justifying historical abuses, examining the factors that constrain their appeal becomes increasingly important.

The Chilean case offers a particularly relevant test because the right and far-right parties studied here have direct connections to the dictatorship era. The UDI was founded by dictatorship collaborators, while the founder of the PRCh, and now President of Chile, José Antonio Kast, has expressed admiration for Pinochet and the legacy of the dictatorship, making memory sites especially salient for his government. In fact, just a few weeks after taking office, Kast announced that he would revoke the previous government's decree, which

[2]Such was the case of the Ex-Cuartel Borgoño, which was almost demolished in 2016 (Medina, 2016), but was later granted the status of historical monument, preventing its destruction (Mondaca, 2025).

sought to expropriate Colonia Dignidad (a German enclave in southern Chile, known for having lent its grounds to the dictatorship for torture and imprisonment) to turn it into a memorial site (Bartlett, 2026).

Data

I obtained data on memory sites from the Chilean Ministry of Justice's Subsecretariat of Human Rights, which maintains a comprehensive registry documenting sites related to human rights abuses during the dictatorship. This registry follows the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights' definition of memory sites (CIDH, 2019) and organizes such sites into three categories: places where human rights violations occurred, places where human rights were defended, and places of commemoration.

I supplemented this registry with data from the National Monuments Council (Consejo de Monumentos Nacionales, CMN), which administers the official protection mechanism for memory sites by designating them as historical monuments (see SI Section B.1 for further details). The CMN has declared 70 memory sites as such: 10 movable sites (archives) and 60 immovable sites (buildings and physical locations). The CMN data includes exact dates when sites received their official monument designation, facilitating the tracking of the timeline of memory site formalization as historical monuments.

For this analysis, I focus on the immovable sites: the physical locations of former detention and torture centers, commemorative spaces, and sites of resistance that have been repurposed or designated as memory sites. The exact location of these sites comes from the aforementioned Subsecretariat's official registry, which maps the coordinates of each site in the registry, yielding 1,019 sites with valid coordinates across all 16 regions of Chile (see SI Section B.1.1 for further details). I use these coordinates to calculate geodesic distances between memory sites and voting locations.

I compiled precinct-level electoral results from the Electoral Service (SERVEL) covering all elections in which the PRCh participated since its founding in 2019, spanning the 2021, 2024, and 2025 electoral cycles across presidential, congressional, and local races. For the main analysis, I focus on the first round of the presidential election, where the ideological profile of far-right candidates is most visible to voters and party labels are most salient. I calculated vote shares for the PRCh, the PNL (which competed for the first time in 2025 after splitting from

the PRCh in 2024), and the UDI, the traditional right-wing party, to test whether proximity to memory sites affects established and emerging far-right parties differently. See SI Section A for more information on the parties and the elections under analysis.

Design

The treatment in this design is the increase in the political salience of sites of memory between 2021 and 2025, not the physical presence of sites of memory, which predates both elections. Two key developments occurred in this window: (1) the Boric government made memory sites a policy priority, designating more sites as historical monuments than any previous administration, and (2) the 50th anniversary of the military coup in September 2023, placing the dictatorship's legacy at the center of national debate for months, with commemorations held at sites throughout the country and the right and far right openly contesting the memorialization agenda (Carrasco et al., 2023). As both developments postdate the 2021 election, the design follows the logic of differential exposure to a common shock, where I compare changes in far-right vote share between 2021 and 2025 across voting locations with different predetermined levels of exposure, measured by proximity to memory sites. Since the shock is national, the design assumes that proximity raises exposure to it, as commemorations and designations took place at the sites themselves. Homola, Pereira, and Tavits (2020) document a similar pattern, with the educational effect of museums at former Nazi camps concentrating among nearby residents. As an additional test, I also estimate a designation-based treatment using only the 20 sites that were designated as historical monuments during this window (SI Section E).

Two features of memory sites threaten identification. First, the military dictatorship located detention facilities according to geographic, political, and logistical considerations that may correlate with present-day political attitudes (Bautista et al., 2018). Second, which former centers became memory sites, and which memory sites become historical monuments, is a political process involving local activism, government priorities, and community characteristics. A cross-sectional comparison of locations near and far from sites would confound exposure with these pre-existing differences.

The empirical design addresses these threats in multiple ways. Location fixed effects absorb time-invariant differences between places near and far from sites, including the non-random


placement of detention centers and the political selection into memorialization. What fixed effects cannot rule out is that far-right support near and far from sites was already trending apart. For this, the identifying assumption is parallel trends: absent the salience shock, far-right vote shares near and far from sites would have evolved similarly. I test this assumption on the pre-treatment period, estimating the same specification on 2017–2021, before the salience shock. The pre-period measure of far-right support is Kast's vote share in the 2017 presidential election, in which he ran as an independent after leaving the UDI and before founding the PRCh. The resulting coefficient is positive but falls short of conventional significance (Table C.1). A single pre-period leaves open whether such a difference reflects a continuing trend or a one-time shift, so SI Section C.1 extends the pre-period to the 2013 election using the combined vote share of the right bloc, the only right-wing outcome observed in all four elections.

An additional concern is that the 2025 election was held under compulsory voting, while the 2021 election was not, significantly expanding turnout although not the electorate, since voter registration is automatic when a person turns 18. Year fixed effects absorb the common effect of compulsory voting on vote shares, but the expansion could still differ locally between locations with different levels of exposure. SI Section F.4 examines this. Turnout did grow less near sites, but the differential reflects the higher baseline participation of those locations rather than a response to the sites themselves.

The main specification interacts the post-2021 indicator with distance bins (0–250m, 250–500m, and 500m–1km) relative to locations more than 1km from any memory site.[3] The outcome variables are first-round presidential vote shares for the PRCh and the PNL. The unit of analysis is a geographic cluster of voting locations: locations within 200 meters of one another are grouped into a single unit, which handles naming inconsistencies across election years and avoids treating nearby polling places as independent observations. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Figure 1 shows the geographic distribution of memory sites and voting locations in the Province of Santiago, where proximity variation is most dense. Further estimation details are in SI Section C.

[3] SI Section F.3 reports estimates under finer binning, including a separate 0–100m bin, and SI Section D.1 under a continuous distance specification.

Figure 1: Memory Sites and Voting Locations in Santiago



Note: Crosses mark memory sites registered by the Subsecretariat of Human Rights. Municipality boundaries shown for the Province of Santiago.

Results

Figure 2 presents the main results. The figure shows DiD estimates across three distance bins relative to locations more than 1km from the nearest memory site, for the PRCh (black) and the PNL (gray). Proximity to memory sites reduces PRCh vote share, with point estimates declining monotonically with distance, from 1.7 PP at 0–250m to 1.3 at 250–500m and 0.9 at 500m–1km, all significant at conventional levels. Within the first kilometer, the gradient is consistent with exposure that decays with distance from the site. Since clusters within 500m of a site started from a slightly higher PRCh share in 2021 (30.0 and 29.5 percent, compared to 28.6 percent beyond 1km), the decline could in principle reflect a return from an unusually high 2021 level. Two checks speak against this reading. Right-wing support near sites retained its 2021 level in 2025, and the PRCh estimates remain negative and significant when conditioning

on the party's 2021 vote share.[4]

The 1.7 PP estimate at 0–250m is comparable to other estimates in the literature. For instance, Turkoglu, Ditlmann, and Firestone (2023) found that installing a stumbling-block memorial in a Berlin precinct reduces AfD vote share by 1 to 2 PP in the following election, nearly identical in absolute terms, though larger in relative terms given the AfD's smaller size. Against the PRCh's 27.9 percent of the 2021 first-round vote (Table A.1), the effect corresponds to roughly 6 percent of that support.[5]

Regarding the PNL, its vote share is 0.7 PP higher at 0–250m and 0.5 at 250–500m, fading to an insignificant estimate at 500m–1km. Since the party competed for the first time in 2025, this coefficient captures how its debut vote share varies with proximity and not a change identified by parallel trends, and should be read as a descriptive counterpart to the PRCh estimates. The two patterns are nonetheless mutually reinforcing. The PNL shares the far-right ideological space but lacks the explicit nostalgic ties to the Pinochet regime that characterize the PRCh, advocating for minimal government intervention, deregulation, and conservative social policies, similar to Javier Milei's party in Argentina (Argote and Visconti, 2025). Where the PRCh loses ground near memory sites, its ideological neighbor without the dictatorship baggage gains, a pattern consistent with electoral substitution, although aggregate data cannot establish that the same voters moved between the two parties. The PNL gain of 0.7 PP at 0–250m offsets less than half of the PRCh loss of 1.7 PP, so combined far-right support falls by roughly 1 PP at the closest distances (SI Table D.1).

All in all, these results point to memory sites operating as locally concentrated reminders of the dictatorship's legacy. The spatial pattern in Figure 2 is consistent with this, as the effects concentrate within 1km of a site, the range within which a physical site would plausibly be part of residents' everyday spatial experience.[6] The PRCh decline also concentrates near sites where violations were committed (SI Section D.3), echoing the finding by Homola, Pereira, and


[4]Extending the pre-period to 2013 with the combined vote share of the right bloc shows parallel movement near and far from sites between 2013 and 2017 in the two closest bins, followed by a relative gain of about one point near sites between 2017 and 2021 that persisted in 2025. Conditioning on the PRCh's 2021 vote share, the estimates range from 0.9 to 1.3 PP without a clear ordering by distance (SI Section C.1).

[5]Scaling instead against the party's 2025 vote share in locations beyond 1km, 25.2 percent, gives a nearly identical 7 percent, so the relative magnitude does not depend on the choice of base.

[6]The effect does not intensify further at the site's immediate doorstep. Separating a 0–100m band yields estimates matching the sign of the adjacent band but smaller and imprecise (see SI Section F.3). Polling places this close to a site are typically schools standing right next to it (for instance, in the small locality of Pisagua, a school serving as the polling place is itself a registered memory site), and since voters are assigned to polling places by residence, these locations draw their voters from the same blocks as polling places slightly farther out, so proximity at that range adds no distinct exposure.

Tavits (2020) that proximity effects around Nazi camps depend on whether the camp buildings themselves were preserved, so that residents can still see the place where the violence occurred. This heterogeneity also supports the assumption that proximity raises exposure to the salience shock, as a national media story alone would reach voters regardless of the type of site nearby.

Figure 2: Main Results



Note: Thick lines show 90% CIs; thin lines show 95% CIs. The reference category is locations more than 1km from the nearest memory site. Full models available in Table D.1.

In addition, I also test whether memory sites affect the traditional right. The UDI's own ties to the dictatorship are substantial: the party was founded by Pinochet collaborators and its 2013 and 2025 presidential candidate, Evelyn Matthei, is the daughter of Fernando Matthei, who was a commander of the Air Force and a member of the military junta. Yet as a broad-tent party that has moderated its public stance over time, the dictatorship link is currently less electorally central to its identity than it is for the PRCh. Since the UDI fielded no presidential candidate in 2021, I measure the traditional right as the combined vote share of the candidates of the center-right to right-wing coalition Chile Vamos, Sebastián Sichel in 2021 and Matthei in 2025. Proximity to memory sites increases this vote share by 1.2 to 1.5 PP across the three bins (SI Table D.1). At the closest distances, the PRCh losses thus coincide with gains for both the PNL and the traditional right, leaving combined right-wing support roughly unchanged (SI Section C.1).

The pattern also varies across election types in a way that tracks the visibility of party labels. In lower chamber races, the PNL gain replicates, while the PRCh decline attenuates and loses statistical significance, roughly half the presidential estimate (SI Table D.4).[7] In local elections, proximity to memory sites has no detectable effect on either PRCh or UDI vote share in mayoral or city council races (SI Table D.5). Although party labels exist in these races, as candidates run with party affiliations listed on the ballot, municipal contests in Chile tend to be more candidate-centered, with incumbency and local reputation being the most important factors in the vote choice process (Argote and Visconti, 2025). The gradient from presidential to legislative to local races points to party-label salience as a possible mechanism: the PRCh penalty is largest when Kast himself heads the ticket, weakens for less-known legislative candidates under the same label, and disappears where local candidate identity anchors the choice.

The main results are robust to alternative specifications. The PRCh and PNL effects hold across geographic clustering thresholds of 100m and 200m (SI Table D.3); estimates weaken at coarser thresholds of 500m and 1km, as expected when large clusters mix locations near and far from sites within a single unit. A permutation test randomly reassigning which clusters count as near a memory site, repeated 10,000 times, yields permutation p-values of 0.0001 for the PRCh and 0.001 for the PNL, which means that the estimated shifts are specific to where memory sites actually stand, not a pattern produced by arbitrary geographic splits of the electorate (SI Section F.1). Excluding reference clusters within 600m, 700m, and 1km of the nearest memory site leaves the estimates stable and slightly larger, indicating that spillover into the reference group does not drive the main findings (SI Table F.1).

Two further checks address the treatment definition and the 2025 institutional context: SI Section E re-estimates the design using only the 20 sites officially designated between the elections, and SI Section F.4 examines the introduction of compulsory voting in 2025, showing that turnout grew less near sites, consistent with the higher baseline participation of those locations, and that the main estimates attenuate but remain significant when turnout growth is absorbed.

[7] Senate races are excluded because Chile staggers senatorial elections by region, and the regions electing senators in 2021 and 2025 do not overlap, leaving no within-window comparison.

Conclusion

This paper examines whether proximity to memory sites, taken as physical spaces marking locations of state violence during Chile's Pinochet dictatorship, affects far-right electoral support. Using a difference-in-differences design that compares voting locations near memory sites to those farther away between the 2021 and 2025 presidential elections, I find that proximity to memory sites reduces PRCh vote share by approximately 0.9 to 1.7 PP within 1km of a site. At the same time, the PNL, a newer far-right party without explicit nostalgic ties to the dictatorship, performs better near memory sites. The PNL gains offset less than half of the PRCh losses, however, and combined far-right support falls by roughly 1 PP at the closest distances. The pattern is consistent with partial substitution toward a strand of the far right without dictatorship baggage, alongside a modest decline in the far-right total.

These findings speak to ongoing debates about the political effects of transitional justice beyond the immediate post-transition period. They indicate that memory sites operate as local reminders of the dictatorship's legacy, penalizing the party most explicitly associated with that past. The effects concentrate near sites where violations occurred (SI Section D.3), and in urban localities, where party competition and the information environment are more dense (SI Section D.5). This is consistent with research on Holocaust memorials in Germany that found similar dampening effects on far-right support (Turkoglu, Ditlmann, and Firestone, 2023), and extends that literature to a context where far-right parties maintain more direct organizational and rhetorical ties to the authoritarian period (Rovira Kaltwasser, Salas-Lewin, and Zanotti, 2024) and where *pinochetismo* remains an active marker of right-wing identity (Boas, 2016). The PRCh penalty is largest in presidential races, attenuates in legislative races, and disappears in local elections, where candidate identity dominates party labels.

Nevertheless, the PNL gains complicate a straightforward interpretation of memory sites as barriers to far-right mobilization. Right-wing populist parties have engaged in forms of memory activism to redefine national narratives along patriotic lines (Faber, 2023), and the growth of this newly formed far-right populist party near memory sites is consistent with voters turning to far-right alternatives that avoid direct association with the dictatorship. Future research could explore whether these PNL gains strengthen over time as the PNL consolidates its identity, whether part of the far-right decline near sites reflects genuine left mobilization rather than reshuffling within the right (SI Section D.4), and whether the presence of pro-

dictatorship memory sites, of which several still exist in Chile (see Infante Batiste, 2024), generates a backlash that could further dampen far-right support. Whatever the answers, the effect documented here is local and modest, and it coexists with the far right's national expansion over this period and Kast's victory in the 2025 presidential race.

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Supplementary Information

Do memory sites influence far-right vote?

Evidence from Chile

A Context **2**

A.1 Right and Far-Right Parties in Chile 2

A.2 Electoral System and Elections 4

B Data **6**

B.1 Memory Sites and Council of National Monuments 6

B.2 Electoral Data 8

C Estimation and Identification **10**

C.1 Extended Pre-Period and Mean Reversion 12

D Results **15**

D.1 Main Results 15

D.2 Legislative and Local Electoral Results 17

D.3 Heterogeneity by site category 17

D.4 Left Bloc Vote Share 19

D.5 Urban and Non-Urban Municipalities 19

E Designation-Based Treatment **21**

E.1 Heterogeneity by Designation Timing 22

F Robustness Checks **24**

F.1 Permutation Test 24

F.2 Spatial Donut Robustness Check 24

F.3 Finer Distance Binning 25

F.4 Turnout and Compulsory Voting 26

A Context

A.1 Right and Far-Right Parties in Chile

The Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) was founded in 1983, first as a political movement, reaching party status in 1988. Since its origins, the UDI has been transparent about its unrestricted support for the military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet. In 2016, the party had an internal crisis when José Antonio Kast, a member of Congress occupying a seat under the UDI since 2002, quit the party, arguing that it was necessary to confront the political left more aggressively and adopt a more radical-right position (Rovira Kaltwasser, 2020). He subsequently formed Acción Republicana (Republican Action), a political movement that preceded the Partido Republicano de Chile (PRCh).

Right-wing populism in Latin America had long combined conservative and authoritarian tendencies, but in Chile radical-right ideas had rarely been articulated in an openly populist register until Kast ran as an independent presidential candidate in 2017 (Zanotti, Rama, and Tanscheit, 2023). The positions of far-right parties in Latin America can be categorized along three elements: conservatism, iron-fist policies, and religiosity (Borges and Zanotti, 2025). These parties resist changes that disrupt existing societal structures and traditions, favoring stability and gradual reform instead (Borges and Zanotti, 2025).

After his 2017 presidential candidacy, Kast built on Acción Republicana to form a new party, the PRCh, which was formally founded in 2019. Kast is a first-generation Chilean born to a German family that had relocated to Chile; his father was a member of the Nazi Party. Several members of the PRCh have ties to the Pinochet regime through their prior affiliation with the UDI, as both parties have built their platforms on nostalgia for Pinochet's past (Díaz, Rovira Kaltwasser, and Zanotti, 2023).

The PRCh gained traction during 2020 in the context of the debate over a new constitution, as they were strong defenders of the 1980 constitution drafted under Pinochet's dictatorship. In 2021, Kast ran as a presidential candidate and led his own list of candidates for Congress under a new electoral coalition called the Social Christian Front, which placed fifteen candidates into Congress and one into the Senate. In the elections of May 2023 for the constitutional council, the PRCh had the best electoral outcome of any political party in a national election in Chile since 1965, electing 23 out of the 51 seats of the Constitutional Council (Altman et al., 2024). Table A.1 shows the far-right vote share across the three presidential elections covered in this

analysis.

Table A.1: Far-right vote share in Chilean presidential elections, 2017–2025

Party	Votes	Vote share
2017 (first round)		
José Antonio Kast (Independent)	522,145	7.9%
2021 (first round)		
Partido Republicano	1,954,607	27.9%
2025 (first round)		
Partido Nacional Libertario	1,799,691	13.9%
Partido Republicano	3,093,700	24.0%

Note: Vote shares computed over valid votes excluding blanks, nulls, and overseas voting.

The party's so-called patriotic values are closely tied to the official story of Pinochet's dictatorship. In the 2017 presidential campaign, Kast stated that "If Pinochet were alive, he'd vote for me" (La Tercera, 2017). In 2018, on the commemoration of the 1973 military coup, Kast tweeted that "Chile chose liberty on September 11th. The country we have today is thanks to the men and women who rose to prevent the Marxist revolution in our land." More recently, Luis Silva, another party leader who received a high vote share in the 2023 constitutional council election, referred to Pinochet on television as "a statesman who built up a broken country" (Munita-Morgan, Navia, and Bo Guzmán, 2025).

The Partido Nacional Libertario (PNL) was founded in 2024 following a split within the PRCh, with Johannes Kaiser as its leading figure. The party first competed in the November 2025 elections, but only at the national level: it ran candidates for the presidency, the Chamber of Deputies, and the Senate. It did not have candidates in the 2024 local elections (mayors, city council, and regional council), which were held in October, before the party had completed its formal registration process. As a result, the PNL votes appear only in the 2025 presidential and legislative results in this analysis. Table A.2 shows the vote totals for both parties across all election types covered in this analysis.

Table A.2: Far-right votes across election types, 2021–2025

Election type	Year	PRCh votes	PNL votes
Presidential (1st round)	2021	1,954,607	–
	2025	3,093,700	1,799,691
Presidential (2nd round)	2021	3,640,606	–
	2025	7,239,404	–
Congress (Lower Chamber)	2021	667,051	–
	2025	1,424,832	679,500
Mayors	2021	58,920	–
	2024	264,583	–
City Council Members	2021	188,592	–
	2024	1,155,206	–
Regional Council Members	2021	371,898	–
	2024	1,395,090	–

Note: Vote totals across local election types (mayors, city council members, regional council members) are not additive as they were cast on the same day by the same voters. Overseas voting is excluded.

A.2 Electoral System and Elections

The binary organization of Chilean politics around two coalitions that had prevailed since 1990 (Cox, Cubillos, and Le Foulon, 2025) began to erode over the past decade. Political events such as the student movement in 2011, the 2019 social uprising, and the successive failed attempts to change the constitution reshaped the balance of power and gave rise to new political forces on both ends of the ideological spectrum (Argote and Visconti, 2025). The Chilean party system had become increasingly elite-driven and socially uprooted, generating widespread distrust of traditional parties and openness toward independent candidates (Bargsted and Maldonado, 2018; Titelman and Sajuria, 2024). The adoption of moderate positions by the two dominant coalitions opened a political space for new far-right and far-left parties to attract voters on both ends of the left-right scale. In the 2017 election, the Frente Amplio emerged as a new left coalition, and José Antonio Kast launched a presidential bid as an independent far-right candidate (Munita-Morgan, Navia, and Bo Guzmán, 2025).

The reintroduction of mandatory voting, first applied in the September 2022 constitutional referendum, further accelerated these shifts. The new electorate it brought in leaned toward the rejection of the constitution that was to replace Pinochet's, and in the subsequent constitutional council election these voters supported the PRCh over the traditional right and center-right parties (Altman et al., 2024). This pattern points to a broader realignment in which the far right absorbed a portion of the new electorate that traditional parties failed to retain. SI

Section F.4 examines the implications of this expansion for the identification strategy.

The defense of Pinochet's legacy remains a marker of identity for the hard-core right. Right-wing voters' positive reactions to candidates aligned with Pinochet or who favor his regime can be interpreted as in-group identity voting, similar to evangelicals' preference for a fellow believer (Boas, 2016). This identity dimension helps explain the electoral durability of the PRCh beyond a purely programmatic appeal.

B Data

The Subsecretariat of Human Rights registry organizes memory sites into three categories. The first (places where violations occurred) draws primarily from the 2004 report of the National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture (*Informe de la Comisión Nacional sobre Prisión Política y Tortura*, known as the Valech Commission), which identified 1,132 detention and torture centers used during the dictatorship. The second represents an initial effort to document locations where individuals and organizations defended and resisted human rights violations. The third encompasses memorials and monuments reflecting memorialization policies implemented throughout the country. According to the Ministry's definition, a memory site includes any location where grave human rights violations were committed or suffered, where resistance to such violations took place, or that victims or local communities consider appropriate for commemorating these events and transmitting knowledge about traumatic processes.[1]

B.1 Memory Sites and Council of National Monuments

Memory sites come from two sources: the aforementioned Subsecretariat's registry of memory sites and the National Monuments Council (CMN), which designates a subset of registered sites as historical monuments. Of these, 60 have been designated as historical monuments, 20 of them between the 2021 and 2025 elections.

Designation as a historical monument is a protection instrument. It prohibits modification or destruction of the property, without affecting ownership or requiring any memorial use, and it carries no budget for conservation.[2] It is nonetheless a publicly visible act: the designation is formally declared and published by the Council, designated sites are listed in the CMN's public registry, most carry the Council's standard plaque[3], and individual designations have drawn press attention. Sites without designation remain in the Subsecretariat's registry, and many are identifiable to local residents through plaques or community memorialization, but they lack the formal marking and legal protection that designation brings. Table B.1 shows

[1] This definition is stated on the registry's website (https://memoriahistorica.minjusticia.gob.cl/catastro-sitios-de-memoria/), from which the geolocation data used in this paper were also obtained (see Section B.1.1). Last consulted July 2026.

[2] The CMN designation category is *monumento histórico*; the connection to human rights appears among the attributes of the protected property and not as a category of its own. Author interview with a former official of the Subsecretariat of Human Rights, July 2026.

[3] Author interview with the current Coordinator of the Memory and Human Rights Unit of the CMN, July 2026.

the distribution of sites by designation cohort and category.

Table B.1: Memory sites by designation cohort and category

Designation cohort	Commemoration	Violations	Resistance	Not classified	Total
Designated before 2017	8	15	0	3	26
Designated 2017–2021	2	10	1	1	14
Designated 2021–2025	4	9	3	4	20
Never designated	176	779	4	0	959
Total	190	813	8	8	1,019

Note: Site coordinates and category assignments come from the Ministry of Justice geolocation registry. Cohorts are defined relative to the presidential election years of 2017, 2021, and 2025.

B.1.1 Memory Site and Polling Locations

Site coordinates come from the geolocation registry maintained by the Ministry of Justice's Subsecretariat of Human Rights, which maps every site in the registry.[4] The registry originally contains 1,011 uniquely located physical sites. Seven sites appear with two coordinate entries each; in each case I retain the coordinate consistent with the locality named in the site's registry entry. Eight sites designated as historical monuments after the registry snapshot are absent from it and enter the data with coordinates from their CMN designation records, giving the final dataset of 1,019 sites across all 16 regions of Chile.

Distances between memory sites and voting locations are geodesic distances on the WGS84 ellipsoid, computed with the `geosphere` package in R, which accounts for the curvature of the Earth and is appropriate for the geographic scale of Chile. Voting locations in Easter Island and Robinson Crusoe Island are excluded from distance-based analyses since no memory sites are located on these islands, though they are retained in the electoral dataset. The total number of unique voting locations in the analysis is 6,271. Table B.2 shows how many of these locations fall within each distance threshold under alternative proximity definitions, including proximity to the 20 sites designated between the 2021 and 2025 elections, and Table B.3 shows the distribution of distances to the nearest memory site.

[4] See https://memoriahistorica.minjusticia.gob.cl/geolocalizacion/, accessible only from Chile or through a VPN.

Table B.2: Voting locations near memory sites under alternative treatment definitions

Treatment definition	N locations	% of all locations
All registered sites		
Any site, 250m	664	10.6
Any site, 500m	1828	29.2
Any site, 1km	3387	54.0
Any site, 2km	4643	74.0
Historical Monument sites only		
Monument site, 500m	214	3.4
Monument site, 1km	550	8.8
Sites designated 2021–2025 only		
Newly designated site, 500m	86	1.4
Newly designated site, 1km	230	3.7

Note: Computed on all 6,271 voting locations in the analysis.

Table B.3: Distance from voting locations to nearest memory site

	All registered sites (m)	Historical Monument sites (m)
Mean	3,578	27,762
Median	890	9,068
SD	11,485	37,171
Min	5	27
Max	242,405	340,340

Note: Geodesic distances in meters across the 6,271 voting locations in the analysis; island locations excluded.

B.2 Electoral Data

Since the PRCh was founded in 2019, the 2017 presidential first round uses Kast's vote share as an independent candidate as the pre-treatment measure of far-right support. Section C.1 adds the 2013 presidential first round to extend the pre-period, using the combined right bloc as the outcome. Table B.4 compares locations within 500m of a memory site to those farther away under three proximity definitions. Mean vote shares are very similar across the two groups in all three, including proximity to the 20 sites designated between 2021 and 2025.

Table B.4: Kast vote share in 2017 by proximity to memory sites

Proximity definition	Group	N locations	Mean Kast share 2017	SD
Any site	Beyond 500m	1,408	8.1%	3.5%
	Within 500m	739	8.3%	3.9%
Historical Monument site	Beyond 500m	2,079	8.2%	3.6%
	Within 500m	68	7.2%	2.8%
Designated 2021–2025	Beyond 500m	2,121	8.2%	3.6%
	Within 500m	26	7.4%	2.8%

Note: Proximity is measured to the nearest memory site of the relevant type, computed on the voting locations active in 2017, the pre-period. Counts are smaller than in Table B.2, which covers all locations in the analysis, because the number of polling places expanded for the 2025 election under compulsory voting.

C Estimation and Identification

I estimate the effect of proximity to memory sites on far-right vote share using a difference-in-differences design that compares voting locations near memory sites to those farther away, before and after the 2021–2025 electoral cycle. Voting locations are aggregated to 200m geographic clusters to handle naming inconsistencies across election years and avoid treating nearby polling places as independent observations. Proximity is measured to the registry of 1,019 memory sites maintained by the Subsecretariat of Human Rights. The main outcome variables are vote shares for the PRCh, the PNL, and the traditional right, all measured in the first round of the presidential election. The traditional right combines the UDI, RN, and Evópoli candidates, since the UDI did not field a presidential candidate of its own in 2021. The legislative and local models in Section D.2 use UDI vote share instead, as the party competed in both years in those races.

The main specification is as follows:

$$y_{it} = \sum_{k} \beta_k (\text{Bin}_{ki} \times \text{Post}_t) + \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{it} \tag{1}$$

where $\text{Bin}_{ki} = 1$ if cluster i falls within distance bin k from the nearest memory site, with bins defined as 0–250m, 250–500m, and 500m–1km. Locations more than 1km from any memory site serve as the reference category. Section F.3 reports estimates under a finer binning that separates the 0–100m and 100–250m ranges, and Section D.1 under a continuous distance specification.

Each β_k captures the differential change in vote share for clusters at distance k relative to the reference category, from 2021 to 2025. For robustness checks (Section F), the designation-based analysis (Section E), and the legislative and local election results (Section D.2), I also estimate the simpler binary specification:

$$y_{it} = \beta (\text{Near}_i \times \text{Post}_t) + \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{it} \tag{2}$$

where $\text{Near}_i = 1$ if the cluster has at least one memory site within 500m. In both specifications, α_i are cluster fixed effects that absorb all time-invariant characteristics of each location, γ_t are year fixed effects that absorb national electoral trends common to all locations, and standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

To assess the parallel trends assumption, I additionally estimate the pre-trends specification:

$$y_{it} = \delta(\text{Near}_i \times \text{Post}_{2021,t}) + \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{it} \tag{3}$$

where $\text{Post}_{2021,t} = 1$ for the 2021 election, using the 2017 election as the pre-period. Since the PRCh was founded in 2019, the 2017 data point uses Kast's vote share as an independent candidate as the measure of far-right support. If parallel trends holds, δ should be close to zero and insignificant. The estimated coefficient is $\hat{\delta} = 0.011$ ($p = 0.102$), as shown in Table C.1. The estimate falls short of conventional significance, yet it is positive and nearly twice the magnitude of the corresponding 2021–2025 estimate, which leaves open whether locations near and far from sites were already diverging before the treatment window. A single pre-period also leaves open whether such a divergence reflects a continuing trend or a one-time shift, and the 2017 measure relies on Kast's vote share as an independent candidate, which is only partly comparable with the PRCh label in 2021. Section C.1 addresses these limitations by extending the pre-period to 2013 with an outcome defined consistently across all four elections, and by examining whether the main estimates reflect reversion from a 2021 peak in PRCh support near sites.

Table C.1: Difference-in-differences estimates for the pre-period and the 2021–2025 window

	Pre-period (2017–2021)	2021–2025
Near × Post	0.011	−0.006*
	(0.006)	(0.003)
Observations	2958	3748
Adj. R^2	0.761	0.873
Cluster FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes

Note: * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Both models use the binary proximity indicator (any registered site within 500m) and 200m location clusters. Outcome is combined far-right vote share; the 2017 value uses Kast's vote share as an independent candidate. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipality level.

C.1 Extended Pre-Period and Mean Reversion

The main design compares 2021 and 2025 with 2017 as its only pre-treatment election. A single pre-period cannot show whether the gap between clusters near and far from sites was stable before 2021, or whether 2021 marked a temporary deviation that would revert by 2025 regardless of any exposure to memory sites. An earlier election allows both possibilities to be checked. I add the 2013 presidential first round, the earliest election held under the voluntary voting regime with automatic registration introduced in 2012, the same regime as in 2017 and 2021.

Since the PRCh was founded in 2019 and Kast did not run in 2013, no far-right outcome is defined across the full period. I therefore use the combined vote share of the right bloc, which is observed in all four presidential elections.[5] Polling places active in 2013 and 2017 are linked to the 200m clusters of the main analysis, with each location assigned to the cluster of its nearest 2021–2025 polling place when the two lie within 200m of each other. This procedure keeps the cluster definitions, distance bins, and municipality assignment of the main analysis unchanged, and links 79 percent of 2013 locations and 93 percent of 2017 locations to a cluster. Of the 1,874 clusters in the main analysis, 983 are observed in 2013 and 1,327 in 2017, since the number of polling places expanded over the period, particularly with the return of compulsory voting in 2025.

I estimate the following specification:


$$y_{it} = \sum_{t \neq 2021} \sum_{k} \theta_{kt} (\text{Bin}_{ki} \times \text{Year}_t) + \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{it} \tag{4}$$

where Year_t indicates election $t \in \{2013, 2017, 2025\}$, 2021 is the reference election, and the distance bins and fixed effects are defined as in Equation 1. The coefficients $\theta_{k,2013}$ and $\theta_{k,2017}$ measure differences between clusters at distance k and clusters more than 1km away before the salience shock, relative to 2021, and $\theta_{k,2025}$ is the counterpart of the main estimates for the right bloc as a whole. The panel is unbalanced, as each cluster enters every election in which it is observed, and I report estimates on the balanced panel of the 935 clusters observed in all four elections alongside it.

[5] The right bloc includes Evelyn Matthei (UDI) in 2013, Sebastián Piñera (RN) and José Antonio Kast in 2017, Kast (PRCh) and Sebastián Sichel (Chile Vamos) in 2021, and Kast, Johannes Kaiser (PNL), and Matthei in 2025. Franco Parisi, a candidate in 2013, 2021, and 2025, is excluded, as his candidacy drew on a populist appeal that cut across the left-right divide.

Figure C.1 reports the estimates. In the two closest bins, the 2013 and 2017 coefficients are nearly identical, so right-wing support near sites moved in parallel with support farther away between 2013 and 2017 and then rose by roughly one point relative to it between 2017 and 2021. The divergence in Table C.1 therefore corresponds to a single shift between 2017 and 2021, preceded by parallel movement. In the 500m–1km bin, the two pre-period estimates differ in sign but are small and imprecise. The balanced panel reproduces this pattern.

Figure C.1: Right Bloc Vote Share by Election, Relative to 2021



Note: Coefficients from interactions between distance bins and election indicators in Equation 4, with cluster and year fixed effects. The reference election is 2021 and the reference group is clusters more than 1km from the nearest memory site. The right bloc combines the UDI, RN, Evópoli, PRCh, and PNL candidates and is the only right-wing outcome observed in all four elections. Black estimates use all clusters observed in each election; gray estimates use the 935 clusters observed in all four. The shaded area marks the 2021–2025 window. Thick lines show 90% CIs; thin lines show 95% CIs. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level.

The 2025 coefficients bear on the possibility that the main estimates reflect regression to the mean, that is, a reversal of the 2021 gains near sites independent of any salience shock. Under that account, right-wing support near sites should fall back toward its pre-2021 level in 2025. The 2025 coefficients are instead small and positive in all three bins (0.2 to 0.7 PP), so the right bloc near sites retained its 2021 level. The decline of the PRCh near sites documented in the main analysis thus occurred within a right bloc whose overall support near sites remained stable, while the PNL performed better and the traditional right gained at the distances reported in Table D.1.

Stable right-bloc support still leaves open a reversion specific to the PRCh, as Kast was the dominant right-wing candidate in 2021. Table C.2 addresses this by regressing the 2021–2025

change in PRCh vote share on the distance bins, without and with the 2021 PRCh share as a control. The negative coefficient on the 2021 share shows that reversion operates nationally, as clusters where the PRCh performed strongly in 2021 lost more in 2025. The bin estimates remain negative and significant. Since clusters within 500m of a site had higher PRCh shares in 2021 than clusters beyond 1km and clusters at 500m–1km had lower ones (27.6 against 28.6 percent), the control attenuates the two closest bins and increases the third. The fixed effects and lagged dependent variable estimators bracket the true effect under standard conditions (Angrist and Pischke, 2009), which places the effect at 0–250m between roughly 1.1 and 1.7 PP. The concentration within the first kilometer holds under both specifications, whereas the monotonic decline with distance in Figure 2 appears only in the main specification.

Table C.2: Change in PRCh vote share, 2021–2025, conditioning on the 2021 level

	Without 2021 level	With 2021 level
0–250m	−0.017***	−0.011***
	(0.006)	(0.004)
250–500m	−0.013***	−0.009***
	(0.005)	(0.003)
500m–1km	−0.009**	−0.013***
	(0.004)	(0.003)
PRCh vote share 2021		−0.432***
		(0.018)
Observations	1874	1874
Adj. R^2	0.011	0.525

Note: * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Outcome is the change in PRCh vote share between the 2021 and 2025 presidential first rounds for the 1,874 clusters of the main analysis. Column 1 is numerically equivalent to the main binned specification. Column 2 adds the 2021 PRCh vote share. Reference category is clusters more than 1km from the nearest memory site. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipality level.

D Results

D.1 Main Results

Table D.1 reports the full binned models underlying Figure 2 in the main text, adding two outcomes not shown in the figure: combined far-right vote share and traditional right vote share. The combined far-right column shows that the PNL gains offset only part of the PRCh losses, with combined support falling by 1.0 PP at 0–250m and by 0.8 PP in the two farther bins. The traditional right column combines the UDI, RN, and Evópoli candidates, since the UDI did not field a presidential candidate of its own in 2021. Its vote share rises by 1.2, 1.3, and 1.5 PP across the three bins, all significant at conventional levels. Within 500m of a site, the PRCh losses therefore coincide with gains for both the PNL and the traditional right, leaving total right-wing support close to its 2021 level, as discussed in the main text.

Table D.1: Effect of proximity to memory sites on right-wing vote share, binned distance models, 2021–2025

	PRCh	PNL	Far right combined	Traditional right
0–250m × Post	−0.017***	0.007***	−0.010**	0.012***
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.004)
250–500m × Post	−0.013***	0.005**	−0.008**	0.013***
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)
500m–1km × Post	−0.009**	0.002	−0.008*	0.015***
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Observations	3748	3748	3748	3748
R^2	0.887	0.963	0.937	0.878
Adj. R^2	0.774	0.926	0.873	0.756
Cluster FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Results used to produce Figure 2. * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipality level. Reference category is voting locations more than 1km from the nearest memory site. Voting locations clustered at 200m threshold. Traditional right combines the UDI, RN, and Evópoli candidates, Sebastián Sichel in 2021 and Evelyn Matthei in 2025.

Table D.2 replaces the bins with continuous distance, entering in logs on the full sample and linearly on the sample of clusters within 5km of a site (1,597 clusters), since the effect is local and a linear term over the full range would be dominated by the mass of distant clusters. Positive coefficients indicate that the change in vote share increases with distance from the

nearest memory site, mirroring the negative proximity effects in the binned models: within 5km, the PRCh change increases by 0.9 PP per kilometer from the nearest site and the PNL change decreases by 0.5 PP per kilometer. The log specification is significant for the PRCh and null for the PNL, consistent with the PNL effect fading beyond 500m while the log form averages over the full distance range.

Table D.2: Continuous distance specifications

	Full sample		Within 5km	
	PRCh	PNL	PRCh	PNL
Log distance × Post	0.003**	0.000		
	(0.001)	(0.001)		
Distance (km) × Post			0.009***	−0.005***
			(0.003)	(0.001)
Observations	3748	3748	3194	3194
Adj. R^2	0.773	0.925	0.752	0.939
Cluster FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipality level. Voting locations clustered at 200m threshold.

Table D.3: Robustness to alternative clustering thresholds

	PRCh				PNL			
	100m	200m	500m	1km	100m	200m	500m	1km
Near × Post	−0.011***	−0.011***	−0.006*	−0.008*	0.005***	0.005***	0.003	−0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Observations	3950	3748	2720	1428	3950	3748	2720	1428
Adj. R^2	0.773	0.774	0.794	0.800	0.927	0.926	0.921	0.905

Note: * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipality level. Proximity is defined as having at least one registered memory site within 500m.

D.2 Legislative and Local Electoral Results

Table D.4: Effect of proximity to memory sites on right-wing vote share, legislative elections 2021–2025

	PRCh	PNL	UDI
Near × Post	−0.005	0.005**	0.008*
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Observations	3750	3750	3750
R^2	0.655	0.844	0.744
Adj. R^2	0.309	0.687	0.487
Cluster FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipality level. Proximity is defined as having at least one registered memory site within 500m.

Table D.5: Effect of proximity to memory sites on right-wing vote share, local elections 2021–2024

	Mayors		City Council	
	PRCh	UDI	PRCh	UDI
Near × Post	−0.001	0.008	0.001	0.001
	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Observations	3690	3690	3696	3696
R^2	0.501	0.801	0.808	0.737
Adj. R^2	0.002	0.602	0.617	0.474
Cluster FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipality level. The PNL did not compete in local elections, so only PRCh and UDI vote shares are reported.

D.3 Heterogeneity by site category

The Subsecretariat's registry distinguishes sites where grave human rights violations occurred from commemorative sites such as memorials and monuments (see Section B). These categories could plausibly generate different effects: sites of atrocity may carry a stronger association with the dictatorship's crimes than commemorative markers. The registry's third category, places where human rights were defended (places of resistance in Table B.1), contains only eight sites, so no category-specific effect can be estimated for it; these sites, along with the eight designated sites that lack a category assignment, do not enter the category definitions.

I classify each cluster by its exposure within 500 meters: near human rights violation sites only (419 clusters), near commemoration sites only (63), near both (58), and near neither (1,334, the reference group). Because the reference group includes clusters between 500m and 1km of a site, where the main analysis detects effects, these estimates are attenuated relative to Figure 2.

Table D.6 reports the results. For the PRCh, the effect concentrates near human rights violation sites: the violations-only coefficient (−1.2 PP) is precisely estimated, while the commemoration-only coefficient is small and carries a wide confidence interval given the limited number of exposed clusters, and the two coefficients cannot be formally distinguished. For the PNL, the party gains near human rights violation sites and near mixed exposure; the point estimate near commemoration-only sites is negative and insignificant, and the difference between the violations and commemoration coefficients is statistically significant. The pattern consistent with within-far-right substitution therefore concentrates in the vicinity of sites marking atrocity. This is consistent with the party-label mechanism: sites of atrocity link the PRCh to the dictatorship's crimes in a way commemorative monuments do not, while the PNL offers an ideologically proximate alternative without those ties.

Table D.6: Effects by memory site category

	PRCh	PNL
Violations only × Post	−0.012***	0.006***
	(0.004)	(0.002)
Commemoration only × Post	−0.003	−0.004
	(0.009)	(0.003)
Both categories × Post	−0.008	0.011***
	(0.009)	(0.004)
Observations	3748	3748
R^2	0.887	0.963
Adj. R^2	0.773	0.926
Cluster FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes

Notes: * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipality level. The reference group is clusters near no site of either category.

D.4 Left Bloc Vote Share

The decline in combined far-right support near sites raises the question of whether memory sites also shift support toward parties of the left. Table D.7 reports the binned specification with combined left bloc vote share (far-left, left, and center-left parties) as the outcome.[6] The estimates are positive at 0–250m (+1.0 PP) and at 500m–1km (+1.2 PP), and indistinguishable from zero at 250–500m. The positive estimates are consistent with the combined far-right losses accruing partly to the left bloc, though the pattern lacks the consistency across bins that characterizes the far-right effects, so the evidence for within-far-right substitution.

Table D.7: Effect of proximity to memory sites on left bloc vote share

	Left bloc
0–250m × Post	0.010**
	(0.005)
250–500m × Post	0.002
	(0.005)
500m–1km × Post	0.012***
	(0.004)
Observations	3748
Adj. R^2	0.868
Cluster FE	Yes
Year FE	Yes

Note: * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipality level. Reference category is voting locations more than 1km from the nearest memory site. Voting locations clustered at 200m threshold.

D.5 Urban and Non-Urban Municipalities

Fine-grained distance bins may carry different meaning in dense cities than in the countryside, where a 200m cluster can span an entire town. To assess this, I classify municipalities as urban, mixed, or rural following the Chilean National Statistics Institute's classification based on the 2024 census[7], and estimate the binned specification separately for clusters in urban

[6] Party-level decomposition within the bloc is uninformative in this comparison because the left's presidential candidacy moved from the Frente Amplio in 2021 to the Communist Party in 2025, reallocating the left's presidential votes across party categories.

[7] The classification assigns each municipality to one of three categories according to the share of its population living in districts below 150 inhabitants per square kilometer.

municipalities and clusters in mixed or rural municipalities. Exposure to memory sites is not confined to cities. Table D.8 shows that 38 percent of registered sites lie outside urban municipalities, reflecting the geographic reach of the dictatorship's detention network through small-town police stations, military barracks, and rural estates. The same holds for the clusters that identify the closest bin, of which 113 are in urban municipalities and 89 in mixed or rural ones.

Table D.8: Memory sites by municipality classification

Municipality classification	N sites	% of sites
Urban	631	61.9
Mixed	154	15.1
Rural	234	23.0

Table D.9 reports the results with this disaggregation. The pattern concentrates in urban municipalities, where both effects are larger than in the pooled specification and follow clear distance gradients: the PRCh loses 2.4 PP at 0–250m, attenuating with distance, and the PNL gains 1.2 points with the same decay. In mixed and rural municipalities, the PNL estimates are indistinguishable from zero throughout, and the PRCh estimates show no distance gradient. Two readings are consistent with this pattern and likely both operate: the party-label channel depends on the denser information environment of cities, and distance bins measure exposure more precisely where voting locations and sites are tightly packed.

Table D.9: Effects by municipality classification

	Urban		Mixed and Rural	
	PRCh	PNL	PRCh	PNL
0–250m × Post	−0.024***	0.012***	−0.007	0.000
	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.005)
250–500m × Post	−0.013*	0.009***	−0.014**	−0.001
	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.003)
500m–1km × Post	−0.011**	0.005**	−0.007	−0.002
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)
Observations	2370	2370	1378	1378
Adj. R^2	0.708	0.946	0.762	0.899
Cluster FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipality level. Reference category is voting locations more than 1km from the nearest memory site. Voting locations clustered at 200m threshold.

E Designation-Based Treatment

The main analysis defines exposure through the registry of memory sites, treating the 2021–2025 window as a period of sharply increased salience. This section implements a stricter treatment definition with explicit timing: proximity to the 20 sites that received official designation as historical monuments between the two elections. For these sites, a concrete and datable event occurred within the treatment window. Designation is a formal, publicly visible act: it is declared and published by the Council, marked with the Council's standard plaque, and has drawn press coverage (see Section B.1).

Treated clusters are those with at least one voting location near a site designated between 2021 and 2025. Clusters near a site designated before 2021 are excluded from the analysis, since these locations were already exposed to a designated site prior to the treatment window. All remaining clusters serve as controls, including those near never-designated registry sites, as the treatment of interest here is the designation event and not the site itself. I estimate the specification at two thresholds. Among clusters with electoral data in both 2021 and 2025, the treated group comprises 19 clusters across 12 municipalities at 500m, and 50 clusters across 17 municipalities at 1km. Table B.4 shows that locations near newly designated sites had Kast vote shares similar to locations farther away in 2017 (7.4 against 8.2 percent, well within one standard deviation). Given the small number of treated municipalities, I report wild cluster bootstrap p-values alongside conventional cluster-robust standard errors.

Table E.1 reports the results. At the 500m threshold, the PRCh estimate is negative and larger in magnitude than the main binary DiD estimate (-3.0 PP, $p = 0.083$ with municipality-clustered errors, $p = 0.161$ under the wild cluster bootstrap), while the PNL estimate is positive but indistinguishable from zero. At 1km, both estimates are small and imprecise. With 19 treated clusters in 12 municipalities, the specification has limited power, and the wide intervals preclude strong conclusions from these estimates alone. Their value is directional, as the sites whose status changed during the study period show the same negative association with PRCh support as the comprehensive registry, indicating that the main result does not depend on sites that were already salient before 2021. The designation-based estimates are consistent with the main results and provide no indication that the full-registry findings are an artifact of the broader treatment definition.

Table E.1: Designation-based treatment: sites designated 2021–2025

	500m threshold		1km threshold	
	PRCh	PNL	PRCh	PNL
Treated × Post	−0.030*	0.009	−0.006	0.004
	(0.017)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.005)
Observations	3698	3698	3576	3576
Wild bootstrap p	0.161	0.356	0.732	0.509
Treated clusters	19	19	50	50
Cluster FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipality level. Wild cluster bootstrap p-values computed with 9,999 replications using Rademacher weights.

E.1 Heterogeneity by Designation Timing

If a historical monument designation raises the salience of a site, effects could differ by when the designation happened. Sites designated long before the study period may have settled into the local landscape, while recent designations carry the visibility of a fresh public event. Table E.2 enters indicators for proximity to sites designated before 2017, between 2017 and 2021, and between 2021 and 2025 jointly in the binary specification. Unlike the designation-based specification above, no clusters are excluded and the indicators are not mutually exclusive. With 16, 9, and 21 exposed clusters, respectively, the specification has very limited power. The PRCh point estimates are negative for both post-2017 cohorts and positive but imprecise for the pre-2017 cohort. The one individually significant coefficient, the PRCh estimate near 2017–2021 designations, rests on nine exposed clusters. The PNL estimates are uniformly indistinguishable from zero. The analysis is inconclusive for the same reason the designation-based estimates above are imprecise. The designated-site universe is too small to support sharp statements about timing, which is why the main analysis relies on the comprehensive registry, where exposure variation is two orders of magnitude larger.

Table E.2: Heterogeneity by designation timing

	PRCh	PNL
Designated before 2017 × Post	0.013	0.002
	(0.027)	(0.010)
Designated 2017–2021 × Post	−0.031**	−0.001
	(0.012)	(0.005)
Designated 2021–2025 × Post	−0.014	0.008
	(0.021)	(0.008)
Observations	3748	3748
Adj. R^2	0.772	0.925
Cluster FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes


Note: * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipality level. Cohort indicators mark clusters within 500m of at least one site designated in the corresponding period and are not mutually exclusive. The reference is clusters near no designated site. Voting locations clustered at 200m threshold.

F Robustness Checks

F.1 Permutation Test

To assess whether the main estimates could arise by chance, I randomly reassign which clusters count as near a memory site, defined as having at least one site within 500m, across the 1,874 voting location clusters 10,000 times, holding the number of near clusters fixed in each permutation. For each permutation, I re-estimate the binary specification in Equation 2 for the PRCh and the PNL, and compare the placebo coefficients to the estimates from the actual assignment. Figure F.1 plots the distribution of these permutation estimates alongside the actual estimates (dashed lines). One of the 10,000 random assignments produces a PRCh estimate as large in absolute value as the actual one (permutation $p = 0.0001$); for the PNL estimate, the corresponding count is ten (permutation $p = 0.001$). The actual estimates thus sit in the extreme tails of the permutation distributions, lending support to the interpretation that the results are not an artifact of the geographic distribution of memory sites.

Figure F.1: Permutation Test



Note: Distribution of estimates from 10,000 random reassignments of near status across clusters, holding the number of near clusters fixed. Dashed lines indicate the actual estimates from the main specification.

F.2 Spatial Donut Robustness Check

A potential concern with the main specification is that reference clusters sitting just outside the 500m boundary may be exposed to the same memory sites as the clusters counted as

near, pushing the estimates toward zero. To address this, I re-estimate the binary specification after excluding reference clusters within 600m, 700m, and 1km of the nearest memory site, comparing near clusters only against those farther away. Table F.1 reports the results. The PRCh effect ranges from −1.2 to −1.4 PP across the three exclusion thresholds, growing modestly as the donut widens, consistent with near-boundary reference clusters attenuating the baseline estimate. The PNL effect is stable at approximately 0.5 PP across all three thresholds. These results are inconsistent with spillover into the reference group driving the main findings.

Table F.1: Robustness to spatial donut exclusion

	PRCh			PNL		
	600m	700m	1km	600m	700m	1km
Near × Post	−0.012***	−0.012***	−0.014***	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Observations	3494	3262	2768	3494	3262	2768
Adj. R^2	0.775	0.775	0.775	0.925	0.924	0.920
Cluster FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Each column excludes reference clusters within the stated distance of the nearest memory site. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipality level. Voting locations clustered at 200m threshold.

F.3 Finer Distance Binning

Table F.2 reports estimates separating the 0–250m band into a 0–100m and 100–250m bands. The 0–100m band contains only 60 clusters, so its estimates are correspondingly imprecise. The PRCh coefficient is −1.0 PP and the PNL coefficient +0.4 PP, both matching the sign of the adjacent 100–250m band at roughly half its magnitude, and neither is statistically distinguishable from zero. Beyond the small sample, the closest band differs qualitatively from the others. Fifteen of the 60 clusters sit within 50 meters of a site, typically schools standing next to the site itself. Since voters are assigned to polling places by residence, these locations draw their voters from the same surrounding blocks as polling places slightly farther out, so proximity at this range measures co-location and not distinct neighborhood exposure. The merged 0–250m bin in the main specification pools these locations with their immediate surroundings, where exposure is measured comparably across clusters.

Table F.2: Finer distance binning (0–100m band)

	PRCh	PNL
0–100m × Post	−0.010	0.004
	(0.009)	(0.004)
100–250m × Post	−0.020***	0.009***
	(0.006)	(0.003)
250–500m × Post	−0.013***	0.005**
	(0.005)	(0.002)
500m–1km × Post	−0.009**	0.002
	(0.004)	(0.002)
Observations	3748	3748
Adj. R^2	0.774	0.926
Cluster FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes

Note: * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipality level. Reference category is voting locations more than 1km from the nearest memory site. Voting locations clustered at 200m threshold.

F.4 Turnout and Compulsory Voting

The 2025 election was held under compulsory voting, mechanically expanding the electorate relative to 2021. Regressing log total votes per cluster on the binary specification shows that turnout grew roughly 13 percent less near memory sites than farther away (Table F.3). The differential is present in both urban and non-urban municipalities and reflects baseline participation levels. Clusters near sites, concentrated near civic centers, entered 2025 with larger and more mobilized electorates (mean 3,787 votes in 2021, against 3,102 in clusters farther away), leaving less room for compulsory voting to expand the roll. As a falsification, the same pooled regression on the 2017–2021 period, when both elections were voluntary, yields a coefficient indistinguishable from zero (Table F.3, column 1), so the differential tracks the compulsory-voting transition rather than a pre-existing turnout trend near sites.

Table F.3: Turnout growth by proximity to memory sites

	2017–2021	2021–2025		
	Full sample	Full sample	Urban	Non-urban
Near × Post	−0.014	−0.130***	−0.151***	−0.121***
	(0.024)	(0.032)	(0.045)	(0.039)
Observations	2958	3748	2370	1378
Adj. R^2	0.893	0.839	0.747	0.889
Cluster FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Outcome is log total votes per cluster. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipality level.

This differential matters for interpretation because the voters added by compulsory voting did not split neutrally. Clusters with larger turnout growth shifted more strongly toward the PRCh. Table F.4 therefore adds log turnout as a control to the main specification. The PRCh estimate attenuates from −1.1 to −0.8 PP and the PNL estimate from +0.5 to +0.4 PP, and both remain significant. Log total votes is a post-treatment variable, so these conditional estimates absorb the compositional channel operating through differential turnout expansion. They understate the total effect if proximity to memory sites itself dampened far-right mobilization among new voters. Either way, differential turnout expansion accounts for part, but not the majority, of the main estimates.

Table F.4: Main estimates conditioning on turnout growth

	PRCh	PRCh	PNL	PNL
Near × Post	−0.011***	−0.008**	0.005***	0.004**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Log total votes		0.023***		−0.007***
		(0.005)		(0.002)
Observations	3748	3748	3748	3748
Adj. R^2	0.773	0.780	0.926	0.927
Cluster FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipality level.

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